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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY

The food processing industry is dominated by large corporations. These firms play a
critical role in forming the derived demand faced by agricultural producers, but little is
understood about how these companies make strategic choices. Organizational economics
provides a framework for exploring the firm’s decision process. However, several theories exist
in this discipline, operating in fundamentally different ways. This paper examines the two
prevalent organizational theories, Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, through a
study of the food processing industry. This sector is thoroughly analyzed in order to make
predictions from each theory regarding the aspects of capital structure and firm expansion. With
accounting data for a sample of food processing firms, these predictions are then tested
empirically using an ICAPM model in a cross-section of expected stock returns. Our results
indicate that Agency Theory is the relevant organizational model for food manufacturers, making
it the appropriate tool for evaluating the actions of these firms in agricultural markets.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective
Industrialization of the US food system has fundamentally changed the relationship
between agricultural producers and food manufacturers. The strategic actions of food processing
firms now have a direct effect on agriculture. Farmers are often part of a vast network of
suppliers coordinated by a large food manufacturer (Menard and Klein 2004, 753; Knoeber
1989, 281). Therefore, the strategies of agricultural producers are dictated in large part by the
actions of food manufacturing companies. Understanding the motivations that drive food
processing firms is then crucial to farm managers. All firms are organized in some manner, and
different organizational structures create different behavioral incentives for decisions (Sykuta
and James 2004, 758). As a result, organizational economics is an effective tool for analyzing the
dynamics of food processor decision-making, providing needed guidance for farmers and other
parties involved in the agrifood sector (Cook and Barry 2004, 743).
The two most widely accepted organizational theories are Transaction Cost Economics
and Agency Theory. The objective of this study was to determine which theory, Transaction Cost
Economics or Agency Theory, better describes the actions of food processors. Little is
understood about organization of the modern food manufacturing corporation. Yet, the strategies
chosen by these companies are a function of their organizational designs. Thus, understanding
the organization of these firms will allow us to make substantial inferences about their intra-firm
decision processes.
1.2 Hypotheses
Transaction Cost Economics has long been the accepted rationale for firm decisionmaking (Macdonald 2004, 745). Yet, to explore the truth of this assumption we will investigate
two specific firm choices. First, we hypothesize that Transaction Cost Economics explains
selection of capital structure in the food processing industry. Second, we propose the hypothesis
that Transaction Cost Economics better describes firm expansion decisions in this sector. These
two null hypotheses will be tested in order to reach our objective of determining which prevalent
organizational model has more relevance in the food processing industry.
To define our first hypothesis more specifically, we outline the predictions that will later
be developed and tested. Transaction Cost Economics predicts capital structure based on the
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nature of the firm’s transactions. Because of specificity, frequency, and uncertainty in both the
upstream and downstream transactions of food processors, this model suggests that an increase in
debt will decrease firm value, while more free cash flow would only increase firm value.
Conversely, Agency Theory predicts capital structure choice through the governance abilities of
financial mechanisms. Relatively weak internal and external discipline being applied to food
manufacturers will result in the expectation of increased firm value with additional debt, and a
decrease in firm value with larger amounts of free cash flow. These divergent predictions about
how food processors select capital structures then provide a test of whether Transaction Cost
Economics is the more powerful model.
It will also be helpful to convey our second hypothesis in greater detail. Transaction Cost
Economics predicts that firm expansion will occur only to minimize on the costs of exchange.
The nature of the food processing industry suggests few such opportunities, but this theory
indicates that any acquisitions that do occur must be value-building. Agency Theory expects the
outcome of firm expansion to depend on the strength of governance structures involved. The
nature of governance in this sector implies a value-destroying effect from acquisitions. Thus, the
contrast in predictions concerning firm expansion offers another test of whether Transaction Cost
Economics is the dominant organizational paradigm in the food manufacturing industry.
Through a detailed analysis of the food processing industry based on the principles of
Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, we will be able to develop the above
predictions about capital structure and acquisition. These predictions form the basis of our null
hypotheses, and will then be compared to empirical tests on a sample of food processing firms.
The model that most accurately describes the observed actions of food processors will be the one
that correctly represents organization in this industry. The contradictory predictions of these
models will be used to resolve whether we must reject the null hypotheses of Transaction Cost
Economic organization. This experiment will thus meet our objective of discovering which
organizational model, Transaction Cost Economics or Agency Theory, best applies to the food
manufacturing industry.
1.3 Industry Trends
Organizational research relating to food processing firms currently has added importance
due to the evolution of this industry in recent years. Several major structural changes have
occurred in this sector. First, food demand has fragmented, leading to a new, consumer-driven,
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marketing channel. Processors must stay abreast of current shifts in tastes, demographics, and
health concerns (Barkema et al. 1991, 26). Second, the food supply chain is being reengineered,
further complicating tasks for the food manufacturer. New technologies, business practices, and
market conditions are all causing significant changes in companies’ operations (King and
Phumpiu 1996, 1182). Finally, retail firms are gradually concentrating (Connor and Schiek 1997,
325). All of these factors are relevant in agricultural markets to the extent they alter food
processor decisions. Food manufacturers eventually handle over 90% of the value of US farm
production, so impact of this industry on the demand for agricultural products is far from trivial
(Connor and Schiek 1997, 60).
This transformation of the food processing industry will ultimately have a significant
impact on every stage of production and marketing in the food channel. Unfortunately, this
industry has evolved so quickly that surprisingly little is known about how firm strategy is
chosen. Numerous small food processors exist, but the vast majority of manufacturing is done by
larger companies organized in the corporate structure common to other sectors of the economy.
This creates a situation where recognizing the decision-making process in this industry quite
challenging, making it difficult for farmers and other parties in the food system to position
themselves. Corporations are multidimensional organizations, and to truly understand their
behavior we must seek to learn the basic rationale that guides everyday firm operation.
1.4 Procedure
We will use organizational economics to examine the food processing industry.
Organizational economics can be broadly defined as the construction of firm relations. That is,
the structure that defines how actors within or between organizations behave. Understanding
how actors work within the dynamics of the firm allows for a much deeper appreciation of firm
activities. In this paper, through an examination of capital structure and acquisition activity
within the food processing industry, we will conduct a test of the two main theories in the field
of organizational economics. This study should help explain why large food processing firms
undertake certain activities. Markets are made up of competing actors who attempt to respond to
the desires of buyers. Analyzing the food manufacturing firms that use such a large proportion of
farm production will help us better understand agricultural markets. Yet, very little research has
been done by agricultural economists using the principles of economic organization.
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Study is warranted given the practical importance of these concepts to the current food
channel. If it could be determined which model best explains firm activity in this industry, then
this knowledge could be exploited to more effectively analyze food markets. It is in this hope
that we begin with an overview of the two prevalent economic organization theories in chapter
two, followed by a discussion of the observable aspects of capital structure and firm expansion in
chapter three. In chapter four, the food processing industry is examined in relation to each model,
with ensuing organizational predictions about capital structure and firm expansion. Finally, these
predictions are tested empirically and the results presented in chapter five. Chapter six discusses
application of these results, and the study is concluded in chapter seven. Through this process we
will be able to observe which organizational model best fits the food manufacturing industry,
thereby explaining the firm actions noted as being so relevant to US agriculture.
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CHAPTER TWO
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS
2.1 Prevalent Organizational Models
Two main theories dominate the field of organizational economics, Transaction Cost
Economics and Agency Theory. Empirical examination of the influence of selected capital
structure and acquisition activity on firm performance will attempt to show which of these
theories of economic organization is supported in the marketplace. Organizational economics has
a firm-specific quality, so this approach can only draw broad conclusions about the food
processing industry. However, these conclusions could begin the process of building an
organizational basis for understanding food manufacturing firms, and may provide methodology
that could be incorporated into exploring other sectors as well.
To undertake this examination we must first discuss these two prevalent organizational
theories in some detail. Neither idea is a new one. Agency Theory has existed since Adam Smith
first pondered the problem of agency conflict in The Wealth of Nations. These ideas were
expanded during the early 1900s by Berle and Means in their landmark work “The Modern
Corporation and Private Property”. Subsequently, these concepts have been considered by those
such as Fama, Jensen, Meckling, and numerous others.
Transaction Cost Economics was first credited to Ronald Coase, who touched on the
subject in the 1930s in his classic The Nature of the Firm. This theory has been advanced in
recent decades by Williamson, who helped add a crucial degree of legal and mathematical rigor.
Thus, both theories have had ample time to develop, and yet there is still no true understanding
of which model best describes the real world. It should be noted that these theories have a
number of similarities, both emerging from the assumption of seeking efficient contracting in an
imperfect world where decisions are subject to the discretion of managers of both capital and
human resources (Williamson 1988, 570). However, these models fundamentally operate in
different ways, and in many cases come to very different conclusions. Accordingly, it will be
necessary to fully understand these basic organizational theories if we are to examine their
validity in the food processing industry.
2.2 Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction Cost Economics is a form of analysis focusing on the exchange of goods
between economic actors. The focal point of this analysis is the transaction. Firms seek to find
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the most economical governance structure (Williamson 1979, 235). Organizations will want to
find the way in which the total cost of exchanging goods between themselves and other similar
entities is lowest. This does not mean accounting for simple price characteristics alone, but also
analyzing the costs of searching for, negotiating, and enforcing transaction agreements, as well
as the accompanying costs of breach (Joskow 1985, 36). In considering these costs, a party must
judge the frequency, uncertainty, and specificity involved with the transaction (Williamson 1979,
239). Frequency can lead to higher transaction costs through the shear number of transactions.
Uncertainty increases costs by forcing firms to bear risk and to undertake measures protecting
themselves from unknown events. Specificity can lead to higher costs through losses due to
protecting against, or falling victim to, ex-post opportunism.
Firms must face production expenses, as well as the transaction costs involved
(Williamson 1979, 245). The relevant form of organization chosen will be the one that minimizes
these costs. Transaction Cost Economics suggests several methods of organizing exchange.
These include market transactions, neoclassical contracting, or relational contracting
(Williamson 1979, 253). Market transactions are simply unorganized exchanges. Neoclassical
contracts are traditional written contracts, while relational contracts are more durable and
complex agreements built on relationships established over time (Williamson 1979, 238).
Respectively, each of these forms denotes a higher level of intensity in organizing the exchange.
If transaction costs are high in the open market, then transactions will be further
organized in the form of a contract. If neoclassical contracting is not sufficient, the exchange will
be more rigorously organized using relational contracting. Separate parties will bargain over this
contract until it becomes desirable to organize the transaction internally. Based on the nature of
the transaction’s frequency, uncertainty, and specificity, the firm must decide how to most
efficiently organize this exchange. Coase suggests that “the distinguishing mark of the firm is the
suppression of the price mechanism” (Coase 1937, 389). The firm’s boundaries exist where the
transaction is no longer completed internally. We then have an appealing theory, a theory that
accounts for the size and organization of firms or other business units, while also meshing
perfectly with the basic economic tenets of profit maximization through the concept of duality.
The transaction cost approach views the firm as a nexus of contracts (Coase 1937, 391).
Whether explicit or implicit, the entrepreneurial function is to create contracts of different forms
and strengths. These methods of contracting will then persist because they are the cost-
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minimizing form of exchange. According to Transaction Cost Economics, the industry has
organized itself for reasons of cost minimization, with the least-cost forms surviving in an
economic evolution process (Alchian 1950, 213). These decisions on how to minimize the costs
of transacting ex-post form the basis of Transaction Cost Economics.
2.3 Agency Theory
A slightly different method called Agency Theory is also available for dissecting the
organizational structure of firms. This approach is based on the idea that firms may not be acting
to build shareholder value. Such a possibility occurs because firms are often not run by the
owners, but rather by professional managers. The defining characteristic of the modern
corporation is this separation of ownership from control (Berle and Means 1932, 8). This creates
the agency problem, and losses result if agents’ (employees’) decisions diverge from those
optimally desired by the principals (owners) (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308). If asset
ownership and risk were restricted to managers, there would be no agency problem (Fama and
Jensen 1983, 322). Yet, there are inherent benefits in separating management and ownership.
First, the limits on raising capital are far less restrictive. In addition, professional management
allows for realization of specific knowledge in management functions throughout the firm, as
well as a more even bearing of investment risk and nearly risk-neutral decision making (Fama
and Jensen 1983, 308). For larger and more complex companies this seems a more efficient
structure, but the cost is the agency problem.
However, the agency problem can be controlled through proper monitoring and
incentives within the firm, as well as discipline from outside the firm. Nevertheless, deviations
from optimal contracting (a perfectly efficient agency relationship) persist in the real world
(Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 72). This allows for the possibility that different motives drive the
firm. Maximizing shareholder wealth may not necessarily be the primary goal of management.
Management has the opportunity to squander corporate wealth should it so choose (Morck 1988,
293). Managers can also naturally derive personal utility from some types of value-destroying
behavior (Morck 1988, 294). The inclination for some managers is to attempt to reduce their
employment risk, and increase their compensation (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 72). Managers
may also derive utility from the consumption of certain perquisites furnished by the firm (Jensen
and Meckling 1976, 312). These conflicts between the owners and managers of the complex firm
as they align incentives ex-ante form the basis of Agency Theory.
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CHAPTER THREE
Capital Structure and Firm Expansion
3.1 Testable Aspects
Economics is a social science rooted in the actions of individuals who nearly always have
divergent interests. Organizational economics considers these shortcomings, and how businesses
are structured to deal with these features in an imperfect world. Whatever the structural issue,
organizational economics is a useful tool in accounting for the imperfect traits inherent within
the relationships that define the firm. Of course, there are numerous facets of the firm affected by
the organizational form. Yet, in this paper we will utilize two aspects broadly associated with
firm financing, capital structure and acquisition activity. Vickner points out that there appears to
be a general void within the field of agricultural economics concerning financial management
(Vickner 2001, 1). Nonetheless, we have not overlooked this area, as it affords readily
observable data about key decisions of the company, making it well suited to empirical
investigation. The development of capital structure and firm expansion decisions also provide
excellent insight about the underlying organizational design.
The capital structure selected has an effect on nearly every activity of the firm. Strategic
initiatives are always undertaken with some form of capital consideration inherent within the
decision. This logically includes the decision to acquire other firms, surely one of the most
crucial tactical options. Organizational economics deals with both constructing capital
arrangements and expanding firm boundaries. Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory
are broad organizational models that pertain to these issues as only a modest subset of the
concepts they encompass. Importantly, both of these organizational theories make active
predictions about these two firm aspects. Therefore, examining these characteristics will be a
meaningful way to investigate the validity of these organizational paradigms.
3.2 Decision Context
Ideally, all projects with a positive net present value would be financed, while those
destroying value would not. Yet, companies operate in an imperfect world with respect to
financial theory. Investment in the economy is hindered by the presence of informational
asymmetry and opportunism (Kochlar 1996, 714). Managers with bounded rationality must make
timely decisions in an exceedingly complex world (Barton 1988, 623). Human actors invest in
firms run by other equally flawed human actors. All markets are imperfect, and the highly-
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efficient capital markets are still no exception. Thus, it is clear that the discipline of the financial
system can be imperfect at monitoring the internal capital arrangements of firms (Gibbs 1993,
52).
One of the most important financial investment decisions is whether to expand the
boundaries of the firm. Optimally, expansion of the firm increases the overall value of the
company. The firm may realize economies of scale, gain market power, or achieve various other
synergies. Once again the real world does not exactly follow economic theory, and acquisition
decisions may be subject to similar market imperfections. Some value-creating acquisitions may
not be undertaken, while other value-destroying acquisitions could be completed.
Capital structure and firm expansion are then two key decisions for the firm, but they are
also decisions steeped in complexity. Within the market there is some method by which firms
make such choices. The design of firm relations will matter when information and actors are
imperfect. Theoretical market perfection will never hold, and thus organizational structure plays
some role in these decisions. We will now look to our organizational paradigms to find their
respective predictions about capital structure and firm expansion. There are clearly some
significant differences between these models, and nowhere is this more obvious than in these two
aspects.
3.3 Organizational Determinants of Capital Structure
Capital structure is an area where these theories make divergent predictions, and thereby
provides an excellent perspective from which to examine their validity. Capital structure choice
is, for the most part, readily observable in firms. Publicly-traded firms are required to submit
quarterly and annual reports, making much of the firm’s raw financial data accessible. In this
regard, we can see the foundations for a discussion of economic organization through the
observed capital structures selected by firms. To undertake such an analysis, it will be necessary
to examine the differences in the predictions of these models for the optimal capital structure.
Both of these theories exert that capital structure is a function of the nature of the firm.
Like many other aspects of economic organization, capital structure can simply be viewed as the
result of economic relationships, here between suppliers and users of capital (Kochar 1996, 715).
Capital is an undifferentiated commodity input to production, and as such nothing suggests that
one type of financing is naturally better suited to some activities in a world of perfect contracts
(Williamson 1988, 579). Yet, as we have discussed, financial exchanges are subject to
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complexities induced by imperfect contracting conditions. The objective in financial agreements,
as in any other type of contracting, will then be to choose the form that economizes on costs in
an imperfect world. The costs considered will differ in the model being utilized, but in the most
general sense financial structure is selected by considering a trade-off between required outlays
and governance characteristics (Kochar 1996, 716).
It should be noted that the financial literature identifies several other factors such as tax
considerations, growth, industry effects, size, volatility, and profitability as other determinants of
capital structure (Titman 1988, 2). Yet, our analysis focuses only on the application of
organizational theory. Organizational economics argues that firms finance themselves in the way
that minimizes cost, encompassing other exogenous considerations. The relevant question is
what costs, and similarly what model, dominate these choices? This type of examination is
possible when the models make different predictions, as is exactly the case with firm capital
structure.
3.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics’ Capital Structure Prescriptions
The differences in prescribed capital arrangements are manifested in the most basic
determinants of this structure. Transaction cost analysis puts forth that capital structure is driven
by the asset nature of the firm. Harking back to our earlier discussion, we know that this theory
deals with the nature of transactions. In finance, Transaction Cost Economics now focuses on the
specificity of assets used in production and exchange. Transaction Cost Economics considers the
idiosyncratic nature of resources throughout the firm, and thus predicts capital structure in
relation to the characteristics of these inputs. Under this theory, capital structure will be chosen
to minimize costs given the uniqueness of firm resources. However, debt and equity finance will
have disparate costs due to the differences in the way these mechanisms operate.
Transaction Cost Economics suggests that equity will apply the more restrictive form of
governance (Kochar 1996, 716). The more intrusive system of monitoring managerial actions in
equity financing will make this system less desirable. However, the resource nature of the firm
may make this form of finance necessary. The use of the more market-like debt mechanism will
be overly costly when the resources of the firm are of a very specific nature (Williamson 1988,
580). The salvage value of these highly idiosyncratic assets would be low in the event of default.
This will provide little asset collateral to the bond holder, and will thus make debt financing very
costly. Debt will then be precluded, and the obtrusive monitoring and control systems inherent in
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equity will have to be employed, as it provides the low-cost form of financing in these cases. The
capital structure decision in Transaction Cost Economics is depicted below in figure 1.
Figure 1

Capital Structure Choice in Transaction Cost Economics

Source: Kochar1996, 717

3.3.2 Agency Theory’s Capital Structure Prescriptions
The perspective of Agency Theory is quite different. This model is based on the idea of
minimizing losses occurring due to the disconnect that exists between the desires of principles
and the actions of agents. Given these considerations, this theory then focuses on capital
structure as a mechanism to provide a measure of governance. Financial commitments can
provide a more intense pressure on management to be diligent. Coercion and threats have added
credibility due to certain legal rights endowed under various financial mechanisms (Jensen 1986,
324). Managers will then have little recourse but to meet these financial obligations, which if
structured correctly can greatly diminish the set of opportunities for agents to shirk or cheat
principles. Thus, capital structure is sought as a way to reduce moral hazards by applying outside
financial discipline to those managing the firm.
In accordance with this theory, debt is viewed as the more restrictive form of financial
governance. Debt holders have stronger claims on the firm’s assets in the case of default, and
thus impose the risk of managers losing their employment and control of the firm in the case of
bankruptcy (Kochar 1996, 715). Meeting debt obligations is a way to enforce responsible action
on the part of the agent, making these parties pay cash flows to bond holders, even if
accumulating cash would otherwise have been utility maximizing. Free cash flows are
distributed, and diligent management is undertaken to maintain the firm’s solvency. In this
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manner, increasing firm debt acts as a type of bond on managers because of the threat of default
(Jensen 1986, 324). This will reduce agency costs, making debt a powerful governance
mechanism in Agency Theory.
However, this theory does allow for the existence of equity financing. This method
becomes necessary because of the risk distortion that could occur with an extremely heavy debt
load. Bondholders retain the downside risk in any investment, possibly leading firms to consider
riskier projects that have positive expected values only after these downside risks have been
subtracted (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 335). Thus, we can see that Agency Theory also suggests
that use of both of these financial mechanisms will likely be present. The optimal mix of debt
and equity is simply the one where agency costs are minimized, occurring when the marginal
incentive dilution effects of equity are equal to the risk distortion effects of debt in the financial
market (Williamson 1988, 578). The capital structure decision under Agency Theory is
summarized in figure 2.
Figure 2

Capital Structure Choice in Agency Theory

Source: Jensen and Meckling 1976, 344

3.3.3 Previous Empirical Findings Regarding Capital Structure
Prior research has been done in this area. Barton empirically shows that, in choosing a
capital structure, firms with different strategies react differently to financial measures (Barton
1988, 629). Further, managers appear to desire freedom from debt whenever possible (Barton
1988, 630). These results indicate that pure economic features are not the sole determinants of
capital structure (Barton 1988, 630). This work lends strong support to Agency Theory.
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However, other research in this area provides equal validation for the Transaction Cost
Economics approach. Titman finds that firms which can potentially impose high costs on
markets, customers, or suppliers in the event of bankruptcy, tend to choose lower debt ratios
(Titman 1988, 14). Thus, debt is found to be negatively related to the level of “uniqueness” in the
firm’s business, as transaction analysis would suggest (Titman 1988, 17). Overall, there seems to
be evidence supporting both theories in the financial literature, but no true conclusions.
3.4 Organizational Determinants of Firm Expansion
Organizational economics also deals with the concept of firm expansion. Therefore,
another method by which we can readily examine the ideas of organizational theory is through
acquisition activity. Firms have the opportunity to expand or contract their boundaries. This
choice is also a function of the organizational structure of the company. The decision to adjust
the boundaries of the firm is internal, that is made by management, although sometimes with
voting approval by shareholders. Thus, the firm’s organizational structure plays a big role in
these decisions as well.
Some companies have been and will continue to be more prone to such activities than
others. This trait can be due to industry characteristics, or other firm-specific opportunities. Yet,
organizational structure of the firm plays an important role. Clearly acquisitions come in
different types, such as horizontal (i.e. geographic) or vertical (i.e. suppliers and retailers). These
assorted categories of expansion activity may have very different underlying motivations. In
some instances both theories predict the same effect for a type of acquisition. Yet, the main
overall difference is in the end results of these strategic maneuvers.
3.4.1 Transaction Cost Economics’ Prescriptions for Acquisition
In accordance with Transaction Cost Economics, firm expansion is undertaken if doing
so minimizes the cost of transactions. As discussed earlier, this theory considers several different
dimensions of transactions by the firm. Should frequency, uncertainty, or specificity make
transaction by open market or contracting costly, then it may become beneficial to extend the
boundaries of the firm. The complexity and costs involved in such problematic transactions make
it cheaper for the firm to internalize them, substituting market exchange for coordination by firm
management (Coase 1937, 388).
Following this paradigm, this is the only circumstance where firm boundaries will be
manipulated. Horizontal acquisitions may be undertaken to capture market power, economies of
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scale, or other tangible economic benefits. Vertical acquisitions will be undertaken only to the
extent they decrease costs of exchange. Unrelated acquisition is almost an unconsidered
possibility under this theory. Firms seek to capture value, and will only undertake acquisitions
when transaction costs can be minimized in some way by suppression of the open market price
mechanism (Coase 1937, 390). This theory then predicts that acquisitions will always build firm
value.
3.4.2 Agency Theory’s Prescriptions for Acquisition
Agency Theory also makes predictions about expansion of firm boundaries. Agency
Theory does not exclude value-creating acquisitions, such as those found in Transaction Cost
Economics. However, Agency Theory does allow for firm expansion that is value-destroying, as
it points out that these internal decisions may be subject to agency conflict since they are made
by managers with divergent motives. Agency Theory in finance focuses on the costs associated
with the free cash flows of the firm. Free cash flows are the cash flows in excess of that required
to fund all projects that have positive net present values (Mann 1991, 214). Under Agency
Theory, the system of monitoring and control is imperfect, resulting in losses to the principals
from the misuse of these uncommitted cash flows. Managers will have incentive to use free cash
flows to finance projects within the firm that fit their own motives, instead of distributing this
cash to stockholders. The objective of owners in this context is to curtail the harm caused by
undesired investment decisions, again minimizing the overall cost of operations.
These managerial decisions are an important aspect of the agency conflict in firm
expansion. Expanding the boundaries of the firm may serve some ulterior motives held by the
agent. Meeting growth requirements for bonuses, or simply the hubris of “empire building” are
possible examples of management objectives (Jensen 1986, 323). Although expansions for such
reasons are not desired by the principles, they can be undertaken in some circumstances.
Horizontal and vertical acquisitions can still be completed on the same value-creating grounds,
but there is the additional possibility that such acquisitions are done for other selfish reasons. In
addition, Agency Theory also allows for acquisitions that are completely unrelated to the
company’s current business. The overall point is that, although acquisition may be valuebuilding, it is possible for agency conflict to lead to value-destroying expansion activity by the
firm.
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3.4.3 Previous Empirical Findings Regarding Firm Expansion
Research has been done in this area as well, focusing primarily on the “free cash flow
hypothesis”. This idea is closely related to Agency Theory. Excess cash flows provide managers
with the opportunity to avoid financial market monitoring, allowing for expansion and
diversification of the firm in ways not necessarily desired by the company’s principles (Gibbs
1993, 52). Gibbs examines the relationship of capital arrangements to the firm in restructuring
and diversifying, finding that restructuring is correlated with increased debt and stronger
governance mechanisms (Gibbs 1993, 63). Similarly, Harford finds that cash-rich firms
undertake a greater number of acquisitions, and that these are more likely to be value-destroying
(Harford 1999, 1995). Morck et al. conclude that managerial objectives drive value-destroying
firm expansion activity (Morck et al. 1990, 47). Thus, this body of research lends some support
to the presence of agency problems in firm expansion. Yet, this research is far from conclusive,
and falls very short of forming the basis to reject Transaction Cost Economics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Food Processing Industry
4.1 Industry Overview
Organizational Economics suggests that existing forms of organization persist for a
reason, and that ineffective structures fall to the wayside (Alchian 1950, 213). Many
organizational forms then become quite industry specific, based on unique characteristics within
the sector that cause a structure to evolve over time. Jensen and Meckling argue that in industries
where incentive effects of outside equity or debt are widely different, we would expect to see
specialization in the use of the low agency-cost financing arrangement (Jensen and Meckling
1976, 355). Similarly, industry traits can be expected to strongly influence the nature of
acquisition activity within a sector. Understanding industry specifics is crucial for interpreting
any structural tendencies. The food processing industry has its own unique characteristics that
affect its organization. We will now undertake an examination of the specific features of the food
manufacturing industry, and how this makeup might translate into organizational predictions
about capital structure and firm expansion.
Food manufacturers are firms that transform animal, vegetable, or marine material into
intermediate or edible products (Connor and Schiek 1997, 3). Food processing is a large segment
of the US manufacturing sector, comprising the biggest overall industry group and accounting
for over 11% of the value-added (Connor and Schiek 1997, 68). It is not surprising that food
processors take on many of the qualities typically associated with a general manufacturing
company. Any illusions about firms engaged in “kitchen” preparation should be quickly
dispelled. The food processing industry operates at a tremendous volume, employing over 1.6
million workers and accounting for shipments worth over 450 billion dollars in 1995 (Connor
and Schiek 1997, 121). To accomplish this, the industry has become very capital intensive and
highly “industrialized”. US food manufacturers are the most efficient in the world, benefiting
Americans who now pay consistently lower prices for their processed food (Connor and Schiek
1997, 75). Food processing today is not an antiquated offshoot of agricultural production, but
rather a technology-driven and highly complex global industry.
Food processors combine agricultural inputs, labor, and capital to form food products.
Not all these products are end goods for consumers, as approximately 25% are sold as semiprocessed products to be further manufactured by other companies (Connor and Schiek 1997,
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304). Yet, aside from this intermediate business, food manufacturers also sell to wholesale
distributors, retail grocers, or food service firms (this flow of goods will later be depicted in
figure 3). Products come in all shapes, sizes, and varieties, with subsequent effects on the chosen
distribution channel. Regardless of the product or market channel, it is clear that the system is
becoming more intricate. Technology has been injected into the system in recent years, and has
revolutionized warehousing and logistics (King and Phumpiu 1996, 1182). This has led to a
much more streamlined supply chain that cuts waste at every opportunity.
Adding to the complexity of these supply side changes are the evolving demands by
consumers. Food demand has splintered, with consumers desiring an increasing variety of
products, and a higher degree of processing than ever before (Barkema et al. 1991, 126). Greater
ethnic diversity and increased income have led to a push for a larger assortment of food products,
many with some traditional ethnic attributes. Meeting the demands for convenience in the
American home is also becoming an ever more arduous task, as time strapped consumers desire
an array of products that require barely any preparation. Furthermore, product uniformity is of
growing importance in a supply chain that values consistency. Thus, the food system has not
only become more cost focused in recent years, but more sensitive to quality control as well
(Kinsey and Senauer 1996, 1190).
We will now examine this industry and its current trends using the two organizational
economic theories already espoused. These models focus on very different aspects of the food
manufacturing industry, as shown in figure 3. Food manufacturers purchase inputs from
numerous sources, while at the same time selling product to many destinations. The nature of
these exchanges is considered by Transaction Cost Economics, represented in the figure by the
blue boxes. The firm is subject to an internal system of control, as well as discipline from
external sources. The characteristics of these governance structures are dealt with in Agency
Theory, shown in the figure by the red box. Both theories predict firm decisions as a function of
economic relationships, but figure 3 demonstrates how the relationships of interest are distinct.
The crux of each model is fundamentally different from that of the other. In striving to
reach our study objective, we must determine which area of focus is more effective at predicting
firm activity in the food processing industry. It will be necessary to choose a logical approach to
this rather formidable task. The only reasonable manner in which to attempt this analysis is to
separately and methodically examine this industry from the perspective of each theory.
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Figure 3 Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Economics, and the Food Processing Industry

4.2 Transaction Cost Economics in the Food Processing Industry
We have discussed the elements that compose the nature of the transaction. Yet, it will be
necessary to further expound on some facets of these concepts that will have an industry specific
dimension. To analyze the food processing industry, we must closely examine these elements
within it. Searching for, negotiating, and enforcing contracts, along with the subsequent cost of a
breach of contract, must all be considered in an industry context. These are all relevant costs to
any transaction that must be equally weighted when considering a form of organization.
Yet, it is also clear that contracts, no matter what the strength, do not always work.
Informational asymmetries can lead one party to dupe the other, or in some way take advantage
of their situation (Cooter and Ulen 2000, 43). Even if perfect information exists, no matter how
thoroughly negotiated and explicit the terms, there will always be some chance of an
unforeseeable event occurring. Some detail will be omitted from the contract, and thus complete
contracting is a theoretical fallacy. The tradeoff in contracting is one of the costs of added
complexity, versus the losses due to ex-post opportunism (Williamson 1979, 246). The process
of coordinating transactions is not as simple as it may first appear, depending on many industry
characteristics that influence this level of contracting hazard.
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However, non-contract aspects also play a role in ensuring performance in any particular
firm or industry. Everything may not be written into a contract, but other factors serve to bond
the parties. Reputations, brand names, and even a profitable business relationship can all be
powerful non-contract terms in certain industries. Firms have sunk investments into building
reputations associated with their activities (Klein and Leffler 1981, 626). These allow trust in a
company to keep its promises, trust that may be far more valuable to a business than any onetime appropriation. A premium income stream will also serve as a bond to control activities
(Klein and Leffler 1981, 617). If the value of this exceptionally profitable relationship over time
is worth more than a single default, then the company will perform as properly as if they were
contractually compelled to do so.
Yet, in any economic sector contracts and non-contract incentives will ultimately fail at
times, allowing for ex-post opportunism, or the appropriation of quasi rents (Klein et al. 1998,
298). This means that one party to a contract can exploit the other’s reliance on their
performance (Cooter and Ulen 2000, 193). These rents are the result of one party taking
advantage of the other after sunk investments have been made. Site specificity, physical asset
specificity, human capital specificity, and dedicated assets are all sunk investments that may lead
to appropriable quasi-rents in any given industry (Joskow 1985, 38). For investments to occur in
this framework there needs to be some type of resolution mechanism in place. This may differ
significantly between industries, but can include third-party arbitrators, the legal system, or
various other methods. Parties must have confidence in the settlement machinery if any type of
contract is to be reached (Williamson 1979, 238).
Contractual forms develop based on the type of environment from which they arise, and
must be considered within the contexts upon which they exist. In Transaction Cost Economics,
efficient organization of economic activities then means matching governance structures with
transactional attributes (Williamson 1979, 261). To understand the unique types of organization
that Transaction Cost Economics prescribes in the food processing industry, we first must
understand the specific nature of these transactions. In examining food processing industry
conditions, we will break analysis into two levels. The first level will be transactions taking place
between processors and input suppliers, which will be called “Downstream Transactions”. The
second level will encompass transactions between processors and output buyers, which will be
called “Upstream Transactions”. These two stages of food manufacturer transactions are shown
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below in figure 4. Downstream and Upstream transactions are quite different in this case, and
noting this difference will help in understanding the specific predictions of Transaction Costs
Economics about the food processing industry.
Figure 4

Downstream and Upstream Transactions

4.3 Downstream Transactions
4.3.1 Downstream Specificity
The main input purchases of food processors are commodity agricultural products, labor,
business services, and physical machinery. Transactions conducted by food processors are
dominated by purchasing unspecialized labor and commodity inputs, making up approximately
13% and 58% of total costs respectively (Connor and Schiek 1997, 220). The people and
materials that make up this process are not highly idiosyncratic resources, but the same cannot be
said of the food processing industry’s physical capital. It is important to observe the degree of
physical asset specificity in the capital inputs used in food processing (Morrison 1997, 110).
Buildings and processing equipment are the most ready examples of specialized assets.
Processing plants are continually growing more automated to realize economies of
industrialization (Harris et al. 2002, 3). Outside of the rapid processing of commodity inputs into
food outputs, these machines have little, if any, second best use. Other less obvious specific
assets include packaging technologies, or even genetic lines used by contracted producers.
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Assets involved in downstream transactions could often be considered either to be sitespecific or dedicated assets. Dedicated or site-specific assets are not uncommon in the food
processing industry, given the difficulties and inefficiencies inherent in shipping some products
long distances (Martinez 2002, 3). In addition, though most human capital may not be a specific
asset in downstream transactions, some unique knowledge is required in procuring a steady and
consistent supply of the often perishable inputs needed to meet efficient quality and capacity
levels. Physical assets will be the most idiosyncratic resources in the food processing industry,
but these other types of specificity may be important to individual firms.
An important overall distinction exists between the level of asset specificity present
before the food processor, and that present at the manufacturing level. The trend has been for
farm assets to become more idiosyncratic as producers become more specialized. However,
much of the machinery, livestock, and land involved in agriculture could be readily employed by
numerous producers. Some farm resources will be highly specific, but the problems of procuring
and redeploying idiosyncratic assets are usually much more critical for the food manufacturer.
The nature of resources is still relatively common at the farm production level, but at the
processing stage of this channel we begin to see the combination of highly specific capital. The
fact that the processing stage holds a disproportionate share of specific assets will be a
distinguishing feature of this industry’s organizational structure.
4.3.2 Downstream Frequency
In the purchases of commodity inputs required for food manufacturing, we see
transactions that are very frequent. Agricultural products are often perishable goods that must be
purchased on a frequent basis, although this frequency certainly varies. Some products are
seasonal, making frequency exceptionally high for brief periods. Yet, food processors have
traditionally organized their production systems in way that they were able to produce extremely
large quantities for as long as possible (Pieter van Donk 2000, 739). The nature of food
processing then entails a large scale of operations, requiring equally large amounts of inputs on
the most consistent basis logistically practicable. The characteristics of commodity transport
make bulk shipment not only feasible, but also economically necessary to be competitive. Aside
from material inputs, a considerable amount of human resources are also required in the food
manufacturing process. Labor for many production jobs is readily available (often immigrant),
and turnover in these jobs can be extremely high. Many food processors are then constantly
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buying agriculture inputs and relatively unskilled labor. There is a distinction in the machines
and other capital involved. Capital items are very durable, and can be made to last as long as
decades. Overall, while material inputs and labor are purchased frequently, capital infrastructure
and machinery is purchased only occasionally.
4.3.3 Downstream Uncertainty
Uncertainty is an inherent consideration for the food processing firm. Farm commodity
production fluctuates over time, leaving supply and price uncertainty within the market. Many
producers exist for nearly every farm item, so finding these inputs and having them transported is
not usually a great concern, although in a specific year price may be an issue. When processors
must compete for limited inputs, enough of the input item must be available to keep plants
operating at near capacity and to meet sales commitments (Connor and Schiek 1997, 250). The
commodity futures markets can be used to manage such risks. These markets act to disperse
price and quantity risk, minimizing the overall amount of uncertainty the food processor is
forced to bear.
Nevertheless, quality and other characteristics can be quite a different story. For some
products quality is readily observable to a satisfactory level, while for others it can be
exceedingly difficult or impossible to judge (Kilmer and Stevens 2002, 41). Characteristics, such
as freshness and safety of the input, may add some element of uncertainty to the transaction.
These aspects of input supply can cause unpredictability or bottle necks in the production process
(Pieter van Donk 2000, 744). However, government intervention (i.e. regulations, inspection, and
grading) and scientific advances in processing technology help in alleviating this issue.
It does seem clear that this uncertainty is becoming a growing concern for the food
processor. In today’s consumer culture, processors are being forced to implement higher
standards and bear the risks for ensuring that the inputs they buy are safe. As this trend
continues, it will mean increasing complexity in the food processor’s relationship with
agricultural producers in order to eliminate the information asymmetry that currently exists about
many quality aspects (Hennessy 1996, 1037). There will also be a measure of uncertainty
imposed upon transactions with suppliers of machinery inputs. With increased pressure on food
processors, there is an even greater strain on this infrequent and highly specific transaction. In
particular, food-safety related equipment must work properly, and firms producing such
machines must convince processors that they will be around in the future to service these
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products. These transactions are already highly susceptible to ex-post opportunism, and
increased uncertainty only serves to compound this problem.
4.3.4 Downstream Example of Transaction Cost Economics
An example might better illustrate the concepts. Consider the downstream transactions of
food processors in the chicken industry, in which many types of specificity are combined with
frequent transactions and a degree of uncertainty. Unique assets exist within this sector including
production facilities, specialized processing plants, and breeding stock engineered especially for
broiler production (Martinez 2002, 3). These assets have limited redeployability in other uses. To
further complicate, limited shipping distances create a relationship-specific or site-specific
investment in these transactions (Martinez 2002, 3). Similar levels of frequency and uncertainty
to those found in the broader food processing industry are also present in chicken manufacturing.
Chicken processors operate on a very large scale and require a continuous flow of live
broilers, but these firms must also carefully manage risks, including salmonella poisoning or
other avian disease issues. Given these characteristics, this is an industry in which the vast
majority of broiler production is contracted. These contracts give producers strong incentives to
consistently meet quality and cost standards, ultimately fostering long-term investments that
discourage opportunism (Knoeber 1989, 276). The complexity of these exchanges may even lead
to further coordination in some cases, resulting in vertical integration. Currently around 80% of
broiler production is contracted, while integration has risen to around 20% in recent years
(Martinez 2002, 2). In this example we can then see how the nature of transactions affects the
downstream organization of the food processing industry.
4.4 Upstream Transactions
4.4.1 Upstream Specificity
The asset specificity involved in the upstream movement of food products once again
seems relatively high. Large food processors operate with significant economies of scale, and
produce massive quantities of goods in order to reduce per-unit costs. Many processors sell very
similar products to every outlet in which they do business. This leads to the long production runs
and accumulated stocks of end products common to food processors (Pieter van Donk 2000,
743). However, this is not merely the nature of food processing. Retail chains want a dependable
supplier of standardized products in all stores. Even consumers value consistency in food
products. For processors undertaking private-label production there is an additional element of
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specificity in these products, but it seems that even this is not great. Aside from some labeling or
batch recipe differences, the transaction is not much more relationship-specific than for brand
name producers (Connor and Schiek 1997, 332).
Although the transactions may become routine, the resources required to logistically
accomplish moving large quantities of products through this system are not. Shipping, handling,
and other marketing functions involved in food processing are not in themselves highly
specialized. In most instances little service is required, with the possible exception of basic
transportation, which could itself be rather specific if the product is perishable. Overall, what is
specific are the assets required to coordinate these operations with efficient costs. Electronic data
interchange (EDI), computer assisted ordering (CAO) and other developments are becoming
increasingly necessary to integrate into the mainstream food supply chain (King and Phumpiu
1996, 1181). Information and logistical technology will then clearly be important forms of
physical asset specificity.
Site specificity seems likely to be low in upstream transactions, as processed food
products are often relatively easy to ship. However, human asset specificity may be noticeably
greater in this case since the skills of category managers, logistical personal, packaging experts,
and marketing specialists will be very important (King and Phumpiu 1996, 1183). Dedicated
assets abound and overlap everywhere in these transactions, as we notice a large amount of
physical and human capital devoted solely to working with large retailers. The overall disparity
of specific assets between food processors and retailers is not as great as we saw in the
downstream channel. Yet, compared to buildings, sales technology, and inventory equipment
used by retailers, the assets of the food processor are of a slightly more idiosyncratic nature.
Again, the nature of transactions is not highly specific for the majority of the goods involved, but
we must characterize the assets needed to facilitate these upstream transactions as being quite
specialized.
4.4.2 Upstream Frequency
There is frequent interaction between food processors and upstream buyers, although this
aspect can vary by product. Transactions of fresh products are necessarily more frequent, while
dry goods can be purchased far less frequently. However, transactions throughout the food
system for nearly every type of good are becoming more frequent (Vickner 2001, 6). Recent
retail methods such as “efficient consumer response” and “efficient replenishment” have

24

revolutionized the way logistics operate in the market (King and Phumpiu 1996, 1181). Keeping
inventories down is cost minimizing, while closely tracking purchases ensures that limited shelf
space is fully utilized. Delivery times tend to be short, and reliability needs to be high in the food
processing industry (Pieter van Donk 2000, 743). Frequent shipments entail efficient inventory
management, while cutting down on spoiled product. These factors combine to make frequency
very high for food processors in their upstream transactions.
4.4.3 Upstream Uncertainty
Uncertainty is fast becoming an area of concern for food processors in dealing with their
upstream buyers. Here processors face a derived demand that fluctuates. Retailers have
historically passed almost all of this uncertainty onto processors, leaving them with a “lumpy”
demand (Pieter van Donk 2000, 743). Yet, with increased concerns about contamination and the
need to trace back tainted items within the food system, pressure is being applied from
consumers via retailers as well. Publicly visible retailers are highly concerned about the quality
and safety of products they sell (Kilmer and Stevens 2002, 43). Processors then must bear some
substantial risk for ensuring the quality of both incoming materials and outgoing products. In
many cases, a small amount of unsafe input can contaminate a large amount of food through
dispersion in preparation processes. For example, one diseased cattle carcass can contaminate
thousands of pounds of ground beef as the carcasses are co-mingled. It is vital that a processor
meet retailer requirements, as a shipment of contaminated or inferior food can endanger an
economic relationship in a fashion inconceivable for most other manufactured products.
Nevertheless, the food processor does have a type of equity with the retailer in their often
well established brand names. As Joskow points out, “reputational constraints will mitigate holdup incentives” (Joskow 1985, 39). In fact, over 80% of US grocery products are nationally or
regionally branded (Harris et al. 2002, 8). Retailers will have incentive to trust the quality
guarantees of the food processor, given the firm’s reputation and the specific business
relationship that has developed. Maintaining this brand equity is crucial to ensuring quality food
products, shown by the fact that average food firms spend between 25% and 35% of sales on
advertising (Weston and Chiu 1996, 2). However, one serious recall can destroy the goodwill
associated with a processor. The retailer’s reputation is at stake as well, adding greatly to the
importance of this uncertainty within transactions. Food processing is a mature sector with
established firms, but the problems of uncertainty and liability are increasing dramatically.
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4.4.4 Upstream Example of Transaction Cost Economics
An example might once again be illustrative. In keeping with our chicken example, one
processor that might characterize these upstream transactions as highly specific would be the
US’s leading chicken manufacturer, Tyson Foods. In many parts of the country, Tyson is the
chicken supplier to Wal-Mart. Although the scale offered by Wal-Mart is unparalleled, Tyson
can also realize efficiencies in marketing and shipping (Cotterill 2001, 49). Yet, to participate in
this venture Tyson has undoubtedly been forced to undertake significant investments in capital
and relationship-specific assets to integrate itself into the Wal-Mart supply chain. These
investments likely include data management technology, human resources, and other physical
capital devoted solely to serving the needs of this massive business partner (King and Phumpiu
1996, 1182). This relationship has also certainly increased the frequency within Tyson’s supply
chain. Though Wal-Mart is hardly a high-end retailer, enforcement of quality and safety
measures are also likely to be much stricter in order to preserve this important relationship.
Neither company has an interest in integrating into the other’s business, both know their limits.
This then is indicative of the nature of upstream transactions in the food processing industry,
characterized by very idiosyncratic assets, high frequency, and some measure of uncertainty in
meeting powerful buyer demands through open market transactions.
4.5 Predictions of Transaction Cost Economics
4.5.1 Transaction Cost Economics’ Expectations of Acquisition
Given these general conditions within the sector, we can then draw some conclusions
about what type of organization we would expect food processors to maintain. Transactions in
the food processing industry are either common and frequent, or specific and occasional. Food
processors hold key specialized assets in both sets of transactions, though the transactions
themselves are generally not complex. These aspects would then lead us to expect the food
processor to maintain an independent status in terms of firm boundaries.
Some increase in the monitoring required for food products could lead to an increase in
integration, but arms-length contracting should be sufficient in most regards (Lawrence et al.
2001, 372). Even in extreme cases where product must be tested, this complexity could be
handled through neoclassical or relational contracting. As technology improves testing and
grading techniques, incentives to vertically integrate will further weaken (Barkema et al. 1991,
33). There seems little economic reason why it would be cost effective for food processors to
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undertake more intensive vertical coordination. The realistic assumption of diminishing returns
to management suggests that the costs of organizing these activities internally will continue to
rise, while the benefits in this industry seem negligible (Coase 1937, 394). Even in considering
more restrictive forms of contracting, the costs seem to outweigh the potential benefits in many
cases. This concept appears especially relevant to the food processor, as specifications are often
contractually manifested at a threshold level, showing the exact point where costs of added detail
equal costs of broken agreements.
However, we can expect to see wide use of implicit contracts in this market. The name of
the food manufacturing firm will signal quality to both retailers and consumers, and thus the
unwillingness to shirk in terms of contract performance. Given the intense competition in the
food processing industry, we might expect to see relatively small price premiums to ensure this
performance (Klein and Leffler 1981, 622). Price premiums are effective in ensuring quality
when they guarantee a positive income stream over the gains from a one time default. Yet, in a
mature industry firms will compete and drive premiums down, leaving companies to find other
ways in which to contend for market share. This will lead companies to undertake firm-specific
capital investments in brand name or goodwill (Klein and Leffler 1981, 626). Sunk costs
involved in building implicit contracts are important to the food processor. The average food
processor has been in business for a long time, and in many cases these investments are already
significant. Nevertheless, maintenance of these brand names and reputations will be key. These
firms have, and will continue to require, large amounts of brand-name capital with which to bond
themselves to the supply of safe foods.
We can then draw conclusions about the optimal firm organization within the food
processing sector suggested by Transaction Cost Economics. The food processor engages in
frequent transactions of common goods, but also infrequent transactions of costly and highly
idiosyncratic assets. These infrequent capital purchases will seldom lead the food manufacturer
to integrate into machinery production, although the nature of these transactions may lead
processors to develop their own components in some instances. Even though overall industry
exchange terms are not overly complex, meeting minimum standards is very important. These
costs are allayed by the fact that food processors often have fixed brand-name investments acting
as good faith bonds. We would thereby expect to see neoclassical or relational contracting, but
little vertical integration into other stages of the food supply chain. Under this rationale, we
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expect to observe an industry structure with little incentive to organize more transactions inside
the firm. The basic tenets of Transaction Cost Economics are quite clear, the firm's boundaries
will be expanded to the extent, and only to the extent, that it builds the value of the firm by
minimizing on the costs of transactions with suppliers or buyers (Coase 1937, 390). In this
industry, little value is expected to be created through expansion, but any acquisitions that occur
should be special cases where firm profitability can be increased.
4.5.2 Transaction Cost Economics’ Expectations of Capital Structure
Given the highly specific nature of some of the transactions and assets in this industry,
we can also make some predictions about capital structure. There are a number of extremely
costly and idiosyncratic assets involved in both upstream and downstream transactions. Given
this characteristic, Transaction Cost Economics would predict an industry dominated by equity
financing. This theory finds equity financing more intrusive, and thus where possible this form
will not be chosen over the less invasive debt mechanism. Regardless, this equity dominated
capital structure would be expected to persist in the food manufacturing industry, as it is the lowcost form of financing under this theory.
With highly specific assets and considerable risk, bondholders would expect risk
distortion in the food manufacturing firm’s decisions, and consequently having downside risk
projected upon themselves. Investors would then factor this into their decisions, thereby
demanding a higher yield on bonds issued by food processors. This should make debt more
expensive, leading firms to opt for cheaper equity financing. The nature of financial transactions
in this sector should make it such that equity would come with the lower overall costs, making it
the dominant component of the food processing industry’s capital structure. Our a priori
prediction would then be for more highly leveraged firms in this industry to have higher capital
costs, and thus perform comparatively worse.
4.6 Agency Theory in the Food Processing Industry
We now turn to Agency Theory to get a very different perspective about organization of
the food processing industry. A key aspect in evaluating industry-specific agency conflict is the
unique construction of monitoring and incentive schemes meant to assuage the agency problem.
Within every complex firm where ownership and decision-making is not consolidated, there is
some structure for both monitoring and incentives. In addition, several mechanisms also exist to
apply discipline from outside the firm. These external arrangements also vary by industry, and
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therefore we must understand the specific strengths and weaknesses of these forces within the
food processing sector to obtain predictions from this theory.
Yet, first we must discuss in detail several aspects of these systems that are especially
relevant to the food manufacturing industry. The idea behind monitoring is that decision control
and decision management should be separated within the firm (Fama and Jensen 1983, 304).
This means that managers should have some sort of authoritative entity overseeing their
decisions. The decision control function is then a cost born by shareholders to ensure that
managers undertake appropriate actions. This task is usually undertaken by a compensated board
of directors. Additional structures, such as “mutual monitoring systems” where managers
monitor each other or “decision hierarchies” requiring a process of decision validation, will help
ensure agents behave as desired (Fama and Jensen 1983, 310).
Incentives most often come in the form of various compensation schemes. Performancebased pay requires that the manager undertake certain actions in order to realize gains.
Professional managers are economic actors, and incentives are a strong way of tying their
welfare to those of the principles. The problem with incentives is not that they are ineffective,
but rather that they are often too effective (Baker et al. 1988, 597). Caution must be used, as
these systems are so powerful that the principle must be certain they are giving incentive for
precisely what they desire accomplished. Another similar form of incentive that can be forced
upon the manager is that of the managerial labor market. If managers desire promotion or simply
a quality reference, they have reason not to tarnish their own reputations (Rosen 1990, 14).
Agents can also be subject to incentives that invoke a sort of bonding action. This concept is a bit
more evasive, but the idea is that the manager put up some sort of tangible or intangible bond
that can be seized in the event of default on their managerial duties. Some suggestions of the
form this might take include backloaded wages, benefit schemes, and vested option plans
(Hutchens 1989, 61). Bonding can also have adverse effects, since at some point it may become
desirable for the manager to actively pursue “golden parachutes” or other lucrative severance
compensation.
If monitoring and incentives functioned perfectly, there would be no agency problem.
The only losses would be costs associated with providing monitoring and incentive systems. Yet,
there are almost always some residual losses from being unable to completely reconcile the
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308). In reality these tools are effective, but are
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unable to fully rectify the agency conflict for numerous reasons. This contracting between
principles and agents is ultimately imperfect like any other contract. Terms can never completely
encompass the complexity of real world jobs, especially when services or multiple tasks are
involved (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 25). Job design is thus fundamental to applying any
type of incentives or monitoring (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 26). Incentives and monitoring
may be powerful tools, but they must be designed and implemented very carefully in order not to
do more damage than good.
Monitoring schemes are subject to bias that makes them ineffectual through the very
process by which they are constructed, let alone in their challenging implementation. The
monitoring function is most often biased because it is subject to the influence of the managers of
the firm. Boards are often chosen by the director’s slate put forth by top management.
Compensated directors wishing to retain their positions will then have an incentive not to cause
trouble for the management. In fact, the management can even affect directors’ compensation
and perks. Hence, it is clear that directors will often have a reason to favor the current
management team (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 74). Thus, the effectiveness of monitoring begins
to break down when management becomes entrenched or in some other manner gains a
disproportionate amount of power within the firm.
Incentives can also be rendered ineffective. Pay-for-performance is the desirable
compensation structure to encourage diligent effort. Of course, there are typically other
components of executive pay that allow the manager to escape some employment risk. A base
salary and incentive pay usually compose the management’s compensation, with a higher salary
component being found in industries subject to a greater degree of risk (Garen 1994, 1177). The
exact makeup of pay can be hard to determine, as pay can be camouflaged to a significant
degree. This allows wages with very little incentive attached to be dispersed under complex
compensation schemes that disguise components and levels of pay (Bebchuck and Fried 2003,
76). Firms with poorly designed incentive systems will provide pay that is costly to the principle,
both in terms of lower effort and wasted profits doled out as ineffective compensation. Under the
influence of managerial power, executive pay may not be a way of addressing the agency
problem, but rather a part of the problem itself (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 72).
In combination with internal monitoring and incentives, the firm is also subject to some
measure of external discipline. As we have discussed, the financial structure of the firm not only
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contributes to the operation of the firm, but also to the way it is organized and managed
(Sandberg et al. 1987, 15). Financial markets have incentive to monitor a company to the extent
that they have a relevant stake in the firm. Thus, in addition to the type of financing present, the
characteristics and concentration of investors are also extremely important factors (Demsetz and
Lehn 1985, 1156). Larger institutional investors or persons with highly consolidated holdings
will likely play a bigger role in the firm. These actors are certainly important in the monitoring
and oversight they perform, but also in the sheer financial and voting clout they wield.
The basic point is that organization of the firm to manage agency problems not only
includes the within-firm guidelines created, but also has to do with the firm’s needs, obligations,
and opportunities in the broader financial market. The governance applied by debt is nearly
universal, but the discipline applied in equity markets will have a highly industry-specific aspect.
Underperforming firms are ultimately subject to the market for corporate control, although more
promptly in some sectors than others (Jensen 1986, 329). The opportunity for such outside
discipline may be weakened by the construction of defensive measures such as litigation by
target management, block stock repurchases, “poison pills”, and numerous other mechanisms
used by entrenched executives (Jarrell et al. 1988, 63). Nonetheless, in cases of exceedingly poor
management the financial markets will apply considerable discipline within any industry.
For the most part, outside discipline originates in the financial markets, but some is
applied by the presence of governmental regulation (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, 1161). In most
sectors government regulation is not a major issue, but it does have an unusually strong impact
on activities of food processors. Aside from basic market regulation by entities like the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), food processors are also subject to the specific regulations
and standards of organizations such as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyard
Administration (GIPSA). These are powerful agencies that have significant influence over the
actions of food processors. It then seems that the food manufacturing industry is subject to an
additional measure of external discipline that other manufacturing sectors are not.
Agency Theory certainly provides another very distinct vantage point from which to view
organization of the food processing industry. The firm is not an individual, and thus determining
the cause of this entity’s actions is far more complex, driven by the discipline to which the firm
is subject. Both internal and external disciplinary forces are clearly influenced by specific
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industry characteristics, although individual firm traits certainly play a major role as well. We
will again find it beneficial to examine the food processing industry, breaking our analysis into
more focused segments. Considering the Agency Theory approach and its predictions, discussion
will be divided into “Internal” and “External” sources of discipline. The origins of these two
types of discipline within the food processing industry are shown in figure 3. This partition will
allow us to observe the array of industry factors coming into play in Agency Theory, and should
help us understand the decision process of the food manufacturing firm. Knowledge of this
process may then be used to make industry predictions about capital structure and expansion
activity.
Figure 5

Internal and External Sources of Discipline

4.7 Internal Firm Discipline
4.7.1 Monitoring
Food processors have gradually consolidated over time, with plant numbers falling and
plant sizes growing (Connor and Schiek 1997, 91). Although approximately 16,000 food
processors still exist in the US, the 50 biggest firms account for well over 50% of sales and
control over 80% of the industry’s assets (Connor and Schiek 1997, 95). These major firms are
almost invariably organized as corporations, because of significant financial needs in this capitalintensive industry. Therefore, in food manufacturing we see an industry characterized by the
separation of ownership from control, and a resulting susceptibility to internal agency conflict.
Ineffective monitoring systems seem likely to be a real problem in the food processing
industry with its rather established management teams. Minority and management control, as
defined by Berle and Means, are the industry standard (Berle and Means 1932, 75). Stagnant
industry growth can also create situations where it is difficult to tell if the agent is performing.
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Mature markets are ripe for agency problems, since it is hard to distinguish between sluggish
management and sluggish industry performance. The food processing industry is certainly
mature, as its basic domestic growth determinant is the mere 1% annual increase in US
population (Weston and Chiu 1996, 1). Growth and profitability have been higher for pre-pared
food and other “healthy” products, but overall expansion of the food manufacturing sector has
been modest for decades. This industry is reliably profitable, but growth expectations are not
high, making it hard to monitor firms and distinguish poor management performance.
In addition, entrenchment and ineffective monitoring can be an even greater problem
when founders or members of the founding family hold prominent positions (Morck 1988, 310).
This, of course, is not an uncommon characteristic in the food manufacturing industry, with
several founding families playing a role in food corporations that were once family businesses.
Whether boards are relatively weaker in this industry is uncertain, but we find no evidence that
these bodies are especially effective. Overall, we observe conditions in the food processing
industry that typically lead to weak within-firm monitoring. These problems are inherent in many
industries, and it is not clear by any means that food processors suffer from notoriously bad
agency conflict. What is clear though, is that this industry is at least equally vulnerable to
ineffective monitoring and the agency problems that result.
4.7.2 Incentives
We have already addressed the presence of risk in the food processing industry. This
sector is quite non-cyclical, but there are still considerable uncertainties. We correspondingly see
a significant proportion of base salary pay in this industry, as opposed to compensation derived
from performance. This will lead to weaker incentive systems in these firms, resulting in
somewhat higher levels of agency costs. In addition, the use of options and other equity-based
compensation is becoming increasingly prevalent in food processing, as has been true in nearly
every industry in recent years. However, the incentives created by these measures are a perfect
example of compensation that may not be overly effective.
“At the money” options can be repeatedly cashed out, forcing the principle to continually
rebuild these incorrectly structured incentives. Options can be useful, but only when vested “out
of the money”. This stipulates effort by agents to make options valuable, and does not entail
principles having to continually pay to realign incentives (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, 86).
Compared to say technology companies, the effectiveness of stock options is further diminished
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in the food processing industry since their value will rarely increase quickly. Information on
other performance pay structures is not easy to obtain, but again the important fact is that there is
no indication that these schemes are extraordinarily successful within the food processing
industry. With large firms organized in the typical corporate structure, there appears to be an at
least average likelihood of ineffective incentive systems in this sector. Agency Theory would
then predict agency costs to ensue for the food processor.
4.7.3 Internal Discipline Example of Agency Theory
An example from the food processing industry once again seems warranted. In keeping
with our chicken processing example, we will again use Tyson Foods to illustrate these concepts.
In terms of within-firm discipline, it does not seem that Tyson is different from many food
processors. The firm’s CEO is John Tyson, grandson and namesake of founder John Tyson who
started the company in 1935. The father of John Tyson, Don Tyson, sits on the board and
currently holds 80.3% of the firm’s aggregate voting shares (SEC 2004). This is due in large part
to the company’s dual-class stock structure, which allows the Tyson family almost unopposed
control of the firm. Directors are elected through proxy votes, and the result should be no
surprise given this distribution of voting power. On the nine member board, John, Don, and
Barbara Tyson round out a well-represented Tyson family. We can then clearly expect to see
some deficiencies and bias in the monitoring of this firm.
In terms of incentives, Tyson executives are paid base salaries ranging from $475,000 to
$993,000, with bonuses ranging from $240,000 to $2.5 million (SEC 2004). It can also be
observed that options are used extensively in this firm, although likely somewhat ineffectively as
they are vested at only 10% over face value for management. Executive officers as a group
received over 3.1 million options in fiscal 2003, with John Tyson claiming a generous 1.6
million of these (SEC 2004). Incentives then also appear to be relatively weak and significantly
biased in this firm. It should be noted that the grouping of incentives, control, and ownership
could diminish the agency problem to some extent in this case. However, outside stockholders
have provided a large share of this company’s total capital, with little ability to assuage losses
due to agency problems. Overall, this firm provides a perfect example of a food manufacturing
company where agency conflict is likely due to ineffective or biased monitoring and incentives.
Within-firm discipline is often hard to judge, but in the current example it is quite obvious that
this food processor could face some very serious agency problems.
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4.8 External Firm Discipline
4.8.1 Financial Markets
In the food processing sector, outside discipline seems to be a somewhat stronger force
than within-firm governance. The legal rights of debt holders in the food processing industry are
the same as they are in every other sector. Yet, unusually strong discipline is applied to this
industry through the equity mechanism. The reputation for food firms as “cash cows” makes
them especially attractive for takeover attempts (Vickner 2001, 5). Food manufacturers are a
non-cyclical group that pumps out a consistent amount of cash each year. As we have discussed,
growth is likely to be sluggish in the food processing industry, resulting in stock prices that fail
to meet the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500). This makes food processors prime targets
for takeover attempts. Even within the industry itself, firms are constantly seeking growth
through acquisition, and are always looking for bargains. It should then be no surprise that food
processors are very prone to mergers and acquisitions, with between 3% and 6% of total assets
changing hands per year (Connor and Schiek 1997, 113).
4.8.2 Government
Further intensifying external discipline for food manufacturers is the significant presence
of governmental agencies in this sector. In most US industries governmental discipline is a
minimal consideration, but this is clearly not the case throughout the food system. The
government has undertaken the task of ensuring a safe and dependable food supply. The effect of
this public policy on firms has been strict control of some activities. For the most part, this
intervention is in place to protect the safety of the consuming public. Rules about food
preparation or packaging are most common. Although this control often comes in the form of
specific constraints on production methods, overall regulation of the market on behalf of
producers or consumers is certainly not unheard of. Government rules and regulations then add a
strict form of discipline to that already applied by financial markets.
4.8.3 External Discipline Example of Agency Theory
An example of outside discipline will once again be helpful, as we choose to further
utilize our Tyson example. However, this time the effects transcend the chicken industry in
scope. Tyson has been making inroads into the beef business for some time. In 1997, Tyson
purchased a Nebraska-based beef packer called Hudson Foods. What is remarkable about this
example is that it displays both of the main forms of external discipline facing food processors.
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This example certainly shows the discipline applied by the market for corporate control. Hudson
was making thin or negative margins producing ground beef for Burger King. The company was
performing poorly, and powerful Tyson made an unsolicited offer to buy Hudson’s assets.
Yet, what was perhaps more key in bringing about this acquisition was discipline applied
by the government. A month after 15 people in Colorado became sick from E.coli contaminated
meat, Hudson was forced to recall an incredible 25 million pounds of hamburger (CNNfn 1997).
In addition, the offending plant was shut down by Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman until
safety standards were met (CNNfn 1997). The move of pulling USDA inspectors from the plant
was criticized by those at Hudson as being far too drastic. Yet, the damage was done, leaving
Hudson with little alternative when Tyson made its play for the company several weeks later.
Both the market for corporate control and federal intervention combined to doom Hudson. In this
example, we can see how financial markets and governmental regulation can combine to provide
governance for firms in the food manufacturing industry.
4.9 Predictions of Agency Theory
4.9.1 Agency Theory’s Expectations of Acquisition
Given this analysis of food processor characteristics, we can again make some
predictions using organizational theory. We have seen that the food processing industry has the
potential for agency problems, resulting from both the internal and external disciplines applied.
We found the overall level of internal discipline to be relatively weak, but also determined
external discipline to be a more serious consideration. Unexceptional internal monitoring and
incentive systems, along with some mild discipline applied by the government and financial
markets, will lead to some unusual types of expansion activity.
In a mature cash-rich industry like this one, especially with less than intense discipline
being applied internally, we can expect to see traditional free cash flow agency problems. This
industry trait will lead executives to undertake acquisitions for the purposes of “empire
building”, to diversify their own employment risk, or to meet growth objectives in a stagnant
market. At the whim of rebellious managers, many firm expansions in this particular industry
will likely be unrelated acquisitions with little vertical or horizontal justification. These
expansions will probably not be beneficial to the company, only serving to disperse management
effort in areas where the firm does not have competencies.
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Yet, some considerable external discipline has been noted in this industry. We usually
think of discipline as forcing managers to take the proper actions. Although the market for
corporate control and governmental intercession are generally reserved for only the most
egregious offenders, even in these cases external discipline might have an alternative effect.
Food processing firms sometimes engage in types of defensive acquisitions to counter the power
of competitors or companies looking to integrate (Harris et al. 2002, 6).These acquisitions may
be last ditch actions of desperate management, rather than logically considered firm expansion.
Though external discipline is a factor in the food processing industry, combined with weak
internal governance it may have a detrimental effect.
In either of these cases, we witness firm expansion that is undesirable. Agency Theory
certainly allows for productive firm expansions, but to the extent that they are not it indicates an
agency problem. Overall, acquisition activity in the sector could still be value-creating. Yet,
Agency Theory allows for, and even predicts, firm expansion in the food processing industry that
is value-destroying.
4.9.2 Agency Theory’s Expectations of Capital Structure
Knowing the characteristics of this industry, we can also draw some conclusions about
the capital structure we might expect to witness. There are tremendous economies of scale in
food manufacturing, thus requiring substantial capital investments. For most processors, this
burden would be unrealistic for any one person or small group to take on. Therefore, outside
sources of funding should be absolutely vital to this industry. Considerable financial needs will
make it efficient to secure outside investment, and hence to separate the management and
ownership functions.
While food manufacturing may not be the most complex industry, the process of creating
consistent-quality food products on a large scale certainly takes some specific scientific
knowledge. It is also clear from our industry discussion that risk will be a consideration. There
then seem to be further gains from separating management from ownership here. Requirements
of knowledge and capital, along with the risk inherent in this market, will make it efficient to
have professional managers making educated and risk-neutral decisions on the behalf of outside
investors.
Given that professional management and outside investment appear necessary, it will
then depend on the strength of the governance systems to determine what type of capital
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structure is selected. In our discussion, we found nothing exceptionally strong about these
systems in the food processing industry. Management will therefore choose the less restrictive
financial form, and utilize a high proportion of equity. Much of the outside discipline in this kind
of capital configuration is applied in the market for corporate control, but as we have mentioned
this market generally targets only the most egregious offenders. Equity then often provides
relatively weak governance, relying primarily on the internal structure of monitoring and
incentives. When these systems are impotent, like they are in the food processing industry,
significant agency losses will ensue. Some debt can still be expected, but Agency Theory would
predict its presence only in firms with stronger internal governance. In sum, Agency Theory
clearly anticipates an equity-based capital structure in the food processing industry, but with
some debt still used as a mechanism to improve performance by alleviating agency losses.
4.10 Comparing Predictions to the Observed Food Processing Industry
How then do these theoretical predictions compare to what we see in the US food
processing industry? We will undertake only a brief overview, but both paradigms make some
accurate predictions. In terms of capital structure, food processors use a large amount of equity
financing, with generally around 70% of total assets being financed in this manner (Vickner
2001, 3). However, it is not clear why this type of financing is the preferred one. Since both
theories make the same prediction about capital structure, it is very hard to determine which best
explains the reasons for this outcome. Measurement of the effects from different capital structure
choices will have to be undertaken to draw any conclusions about these theories.
The picture becomes even more muddled in terms of acquisition activity. Transaction
Cost Economics predicts an industry where vertical integration is unlikely, but contracting is
important. In 1996 37% of farm output was purchased through either market or production
contracts, while only 8% was produced under vertical integration (Harris et al. 2002, 4). In the
downstream market this theory seems quite strong, but in the upstream market it is nearly
impossible to determine. Information on the specifics of these arrangements is closely guarded,
and almost impossible to obtain. However, it does seem quite likely that even less integration is
present in upstream transactions, although contracting could be far greater. Transaction Cost
Economics seems to correctly predict little justification for further firm expansion, as we can
observe the number of acquisitions falling substantially in recent years (Harris et al. 2002, 4).
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Frank and Henderson even find empirical evidence that transaction costs are a primary
motivation for coordination in US food industries (Frank and Henderson 1992, 941).
Nevertheless, there is also some support for the merit of Agency Theory in explaining
food processor acquisition activity. Weston and Chiu find that related acquisitions in the
aggregate food industry build value, while unrelated acquisitions do not (Weston and Chiu 1996,
5). Bhuyan even specifically studies the vertical integration of food processors, finding a
negative impact on firm value that leads him to the belief that these expansions fail to create
efficiency gains (Bhuyan 2002, 72). These studies uncover persuasive evidence of agency costs
associated with firm expansion. Such findings seem to support the ideas of Agency Theory,
while presenting value-destroying acquisition activity that strongly contradicts the tenets of
Transaction Cost Economics.
The literature on acquisitions in the food processing industry is unclear. Cotterill even
suggests that there is a significant need for further vertical coordination in wholesale markets to
increase overall performance (Cotterill 2001, 35). The literature is more divided over
acquisitions than capital structure, perhaps because financial principles have been overlooked
within agricultural economics. At any rate, neither capital structure nor acquisition activity are
truly understood in any economic discipline, and this is because economists do not have a solid
understanding of the organizational principles that guide these choices. This is the task upon
which we now embark.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Empirical Analysis
5.1 Outline of the Experiment
The contrast is quite apparent between the Transaction Cost Economics approach to
organizational decision-making, and the just dispelled Agency Theory perspective. It is clear that
both theoretically explain some of the decisions that we see in the real world, but they do so in
very different ways. Both concepts are relevant within the economy to some degree. However,
the divergence in these theories concerning the determinants of capital structure and firm
expansion is glaring. Throughout this paper we have established theoretical predictions about
these aspects for the food processing industry. These contrasts are observable in the industry
today, and can then be examined empirically to determine which theory has greater explanatory
power for this sector.
Differences in acquisition activity and capital structure between firms can easily be
obtained from accounting data. Using these differences, we can examine how these coincide with
the performance organizational theory would suggest. To this end, a quantitative measure of
firm performance is needed. The US securities market provides this resource, embodying
performance information for nearly all large food manufacturers. Using measures of capital
structure, acquisitions, and historical performance in the equity markets, we can test which
paradigm more nearly predicts where value will be created. In observing these relationships in a
cross-section of food processing firms, we can then examine the crucial question of which
organizational model explains the actions of food manufacturers.
5.2 Data Collection and Sample Characteristics
Our empirical analysis will be built on the basic tenets of equity markets that are efficient
in at least the semi-strong form (Fama 1970, 414). Hence, we assume that capital markets are
functioning properly, and thus seek to extract some of the wealth of information that exists
therein. We use observed capital structure and acquisition activity to test these organizational
paradigms through a cross-sectional financial study. Data on a sample of firms were derived
from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, with firms selected by Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) codes as being those involved in food processing. Firms were utilized from
the food and kindred products manufacturing sector (SIC 20--), representing companies that
process food or beverages.
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For these firms, relevant data was compiled for the period from 1999 to 2002. A major
challenge in this study was deciding how to construct accurate cross-sections over this period. A
cross-section is a sample with a number of observational units all drawn at the same moment in
time (Green 2003, 878). Yet, companies issue annual reports at various times of the year. Thus,
using a calendar year would clearly not provide an appropriate cross-section. The correct
specification of the time period was determined to be the compilation interval for which data will
be used by firms to make strategic choices, and by investors to evaluate prior decisions. Data
from calendar years may reveal statistically significant relationships, but is ultimately irrelevant
to the operation of the firm. Fiscal years seemed to most closely coincide with our requirements,
and as such data was gathered on this basis. We utilize the COMPUSTAT convention of defining
the fiscal year as the calendar year in which the majority of the months covered in an annual
report occurred. In the end, this choice is possibly no better at aligning our cross-section at a
common point in time, but if the fiscal year is the period by which firms make decisions, it is
then clearly the relevant unit for analyzing economic organization.
Our food processing firms were then filtered for those that were listed on either the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System (NASDAQ). Information should be fully captured within security prices in
these markets, as opposed to more thinly traded exchanges like the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX). This process yielded an initial sample of 117 large, widely-traded food processing
companies. 34 firms were eliminated for not being actively traded over the entire four year
period. In addition, several firms had missing data within the COMPUSTAT archive. The US
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, and Retrieval system
(EDGAR) was used to find absent figures. Two foreign-based firms had missing values that
could not be rectified using EDGAR, and one domestic firm had inadequate cash flow
statements. These companies were subsequently dropped from the sample. In the end, a balanced
panel of data on 80 firms was found and utilized in this analysis. The SIC codes represented in
the final sample, along with two example firms from each, are shown in table 1.
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Table 1
Final Sample: SIC Codes and Example Firms
SIC CODE

Description

Example Firms

2011

Meat Packing Plants

-Hormel Foods
-Tyson Foods

2013

Sausages & Other Prepared Meats

-Bridgeford Foods*

2015

Poultry Slaughter & Processing

2020

Dairy Products

2024

Ice Cream & Frozen Desserts

2030
2033

Canned, Frozen, & Preserved Fruit,
Veg & Food Specialties
Canned, Fruits, Veg, Preserves,
Jams, and Jellies

2040

Grain Mill Products

2050

Bakery Products

2052

Cookies & Crackers

2060

Sugar & Confectionary Products

2070

Fats & Oils

2080

Beverages

2082

Malt Beverages

2084

Wine, Brandy & Brandy Spirits

2085

Distilled & Blended Liqour

2086
2090

-Pilgrims Pride
-Sanderson Farms
-Bravo Foods Intl
-Lucille Farms
-Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream
-Hibernia Foods
-Campbell Soup
-Gardenburger
-Hanover Foods
-Smucker (JM)
-Kellogg
-Penford
-Interstate Bakeries
-Tasty Baking
-Lance*
-Cadbury Schweppes
-Hershey Foods
-Archer Daniels Midland
-Omega Protein
-Pure World*

Bottled & Canned Soft Drinks &
Carbonated Waters
Miscellaneous Food Preparations &
Kindred Products

-Anheuser Busch
-Coors
-Chalone Wine Group
-Golden St Vintners
-Brown Forman
-Diageo
-Coca-Cola Enterprises
-Pepsi Americas
-Monterey Pasta
-Starbucks

Source: Standard and Poor’s. COMPUSTAT: North America. (October 2003).
Note: * denotes only firm with this SIC code in final sample

5.3 Data Issues
The COMPUSTAT database then readily produced a large and nearly complete sample of
food manufacturing firms. Unfortunately, there has been a well documented possibility of
generating bias by employing this resource. It has been suggested that use of the COMPUSTAT
database may cause ex-post selection bias in choosing larger or only publicly traded firms (Jaffe
et al. 1989, 136). All food processors are certainly not publicly traded corporations, and thus we
may have an unrepresentative sample. Yet, additional bias has also been proposed by financial
economists. Selection bias has been a suggested result of COMPUSTAT choosing to list firms
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only after several years of data can be collected (Banz and Breen 1986, 779). Similarly, survival
bias may be incurred due to failing firms being dropped from the database (Kothari et al. 1995,
204). Thus, the resulting COMPUSTAT archive is restricted to firms that are currently viable,
and have been so for several periods. To these problems, further bias may occur in relation to the
time period selection problems that we have already discussed. Look-ahead bias is a dating
problem, wherein data reported at a certain time may not actually be available to investors until a
later period (Banz and Breen 1986, 780). This would create substantial bias in the relationships
between these measures and the firm’s returns.
Several remedies have been suggested for these problems, such as merged databases that
help dispel selection and survival problems, or by confining analysis to firms with similar fiscal
years to eliminate timing issues. However, such alternatives may not always be possible or
appropriate. Neither remedy is viable in our case, as arbitrary exclusion of part of the sample or
discretionary timing assumptions cannot be used in conjunction with an asset pricing model
(Banz and Breen 1986, 792). In the end, the severity of these sources of bias is even a point of
some contention. We have consequently used the COMPUSTAT data, believing our sample to
be generally representative of the food processing industry, and that any persisting bias is quite
minimal.
5.4 Model Specification
5.4.1 Base Model Selection
The basic model specification for this study was drawn directly from the substantial body
of literature devoted to financial economics. A specification was desired that would be
theoretically appealing, while also allowing for examination of organizational theory. Two main
opinions dominate the financial discipline today concerning the specification of models
exploring the cross-section of expected stock returns. The first position supports a “capital asset
pricing model” based on the work of Sharpe, Merton, and others. This model is based on the use
of β , and is grounded in the fundamental relationship between risk and return. The second
viewpoint has emerged in very recent years with the innovative work of Fama and French,
respectively favoring an “empirical asset pricing model”. This approach is based on the observed
success of alternative measures, such as book-to-market ratios, in explaining returns. The current
debate over this issue in finance is rather heated, with strong empirical support existing for both
positions.
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In this study, we have chosen a general “capital asset pricing model” for its theoretically
appealing, somewhat intuitive nature. However, it should be noted that a Fama and French
“empirical asset pricing model” was also constructed in conjunction with the preferred
specification. The Fama and French model is based on the use of market-to-book ratios and
market values to explain stock returns. These measures were also readily available in the
COMPUSTAT database, and thus an alternate specification was straightforward. The results
have not been reported, but the reader should simply note that the two specifications performed
similarly. For our sample, the explanatory power of the Fama and French model was not quite as
consistent, although signs on the parameter estimates of our organizational variables were nearly
identical. This then gives credence to our examination of economic organization, but does little
to settle the debate over proper specification for cross-sections of expected stock returns.
5.4.2 Asset Pricing Theory
We have chosen an Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) as the
appropriate theoretical basis for our study. The foundation for this type of model is the original
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of William Sharpe, which addresses the issues of risk and
return in investment. This theory states that the prices of assets will adjust so that assets with
higher systematic risk will have higher expected returns (Sharpe 1964, 440). The measure of this
systematic risk is an asset or portfolio’s market β , which is the parameter estimate obtained
when regressing a particular investment’s returns against those of the market (or commonly a
market index). Prices will then adjust until there is a linear relationship between the magnitude of
these β ’s and expected returns for all investments, thus forming the theoretical “capital market
line” (Sharpe 1964, 434). Hence, if trying to explain the returns on a security in the CAPM, all
we should need is the market β , since all other risk would be diversifiable. This means a simple
econometric form for the CAPM can be written as in equation (1), where E ( R J ) is asset J’s
expected return, RF is the risk-free rate, λ J M is the market (M) risk premium, and ε is a
random error component.
( 1)

E ( R J ) = RF + β J M λ J M + ε

However, inconsistencies with this highly theoretical model have been noted on countless
occasions. This is where the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) becomes
appealing. The ICAPM is simply an extension of the CAPM put forth by Robert Merton,
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allowing for shifts in the investment opportunity set over time (Merton 1973, 868). The
intertemporal investor will take account of relationships between current returns and those
available in the future, subsequently hedging against these effects (Merton 1973, 870). This
means that investors recognize other factors affecting the riskiness of an asset, and will
incorporate these into their investment decisions. Elements having a covariance with expected
future returns will then be factored into the risk premium demanded. A basic econometric
specification for the ICAPM can be observed in equation (2), where β ’s and λ ’s are the
sensitivities and premiums associated with intertemporal risk factors N, O, and P.
(2)
5.4.3

E ( R J ) = RF + β J M λJ M + β J N λ J N + β J O λJ O + β J P λJ P + ε

Variable Selection and Compilation
The ICAPM then allows for additional factors besides β to be incorporated into the

model as long as they are correlated with changes in the investment opportunity set (Brennan et
al. 2003, 1). Of course, we could never hope to capture all the considerations on the minds of
investors, but prior empirical research provides two measures that act as excellent proxies for
many general effects. In the literature, market value and price-to-earnings ratios can add to the
explanation of a firm’s stock returns (Cook and Rozeff 1984, 464). The size effect, represented
by a firm’s market value of equity, has been found to be a strong force in explaining crosssectional returns as a proxy for other factors involved (Fama and French 1992, 452). In the same
way, price-to-earnings ratios have been suggested as a catch-all for omitted risk factors (Basu
1977, 672). These alternative measures should capture intertemporal risk effects that may not be
inherent in β . With these additional variables, we have the basis for an ICAPM to explain food
processor performance in the equity market.
Once this basic specification had been determined, data on all variables was gathered
from the COMPUSTAT archive. The standard form of the dependant variable in this type of
study is the average returns for a stock, either at the monthly or yearly level. We have followed
this methodology, using monthly closing prices provided by COMPUSTAT to construct yearly
averages of the month-to-month percentage price changes in each stock, a variable we will refer
to as AVPC. Our other basic independent variables were also gathered at the monthly level from
this database, but some of these had to be put in an annual form comparable to our dependent
variable. COMPUSTAT provides monthly β values measuring the sensitivity of a company’s
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stock price to movements in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500). Yet, annual values
have the advantage of decreasing the stability problems often associated with β and other proxies
for risk (Harrington 1983, 80). A simple yearly average was then taken of the monthly β values,
while the January market value (MV) was believed to be sufficient to capture the size effect in a
given year.
However, gathering the price-to-earnings ratios was not as simple. COMPUSTAT
provides monthly price-to-earnings ratios, but these ratios are not defined in the database when
earnings are negative. Were these even available, negative price-to-earnings ratios would pose
serious problems for econometric analysis. Yet, exclusion of poorly performing firms would
almost certainly cause serious bias, especially since companies with negative earnings composed
approximately 20% of our sample on a yearly basis. Commonly, these offending observations
are simply put into a separate portfolio (Basu 1977, 665). In other studies, a dummy variable has
been incorporated for these observations (Lakonishok 1994, 1558). Our sample is much too
small for the first alternative, and we favored simply inverting these ratios to the option of
adding dummy variables. Thus, our price-to-earnings ratios were flipped, and data was collected
for those firms realizing losses.
Earnings-to-price ratios (or earnings yields) were then utilized in our analysis, rather than
price-to-earnings ratios. This method has been used in numerous studies, most often with a good
deal of success (Jaffe et al. 1989, 138; Cook and Rozeff 1984, 455). Logically, there now can be
a linear relationship in the earnings-to-price variable, regardless of the sign on earnings.
Furthermore, there is no reason why a simple inverse should not still capture the risk effects that
we seek in specifying this variable. Yet, it has been suggested that price-to-earnings and market
value may be correlated, as they are both scaled versions of price (Fama and French 1992, 428).
This possibility was investigated by finding the correlation of market value and our new earnings
yield variable. The earnings-to-price variable was also averaged for the fiscal year, but
collinearity between these two variables does not appear to be a problem in the data, even after
aggregation. Earnings yields were subsequently added to our model as the EP variable, and
formed one of the final elements of our base ICAPM specification.
5.4.4 Other Base Model Specification
It is common in financial analysis to divide companies into portfolios. Size, β , or other
measures can be used to separate firms into groups that are more comparable in terms of the
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independent variables (Fama and French 1992, 430). However, we have not done this for two
main reasons. First, it seems infeasible to create groups having any kind of statistical meaning
with a sample of this size. Secondly, we are already using similar firms in the food processing
industry, and as such these firms represent a single possible grouping. Some substantial
differences in firm size and product characteristics will certainly persist, but overall it seems that
this sample already forms an adequate portfolio.
Nevertheless, it is quite true that lumping firms into a “food processor” category by the
broad SIC manufacturing sector (the first two digits of the code) is not a highly discerning
approach, as many very different product sub-sectors exist within this broad classification. To
partially correct for this weakness, dummy variables were included in the model. These dummy
variables were constructed to group companies by full SIC code into more precise business
segments within the larger food processing sector. Eight such variables were constructed, with
the excluded group containing a combination of those firms in the SIC 2090 “Miscellaneous”
and SIC 2070 “Fats and Oils” categories, for which no other suitable groupings could be found.
These dummy variables are listed in table 2.
Table 2
Dummy Variables

Name

Description

DDAIRY
DFVJJ
DBPCC
DSUGAR
DBEV
DWBL
DSFTDR
DMEAT

Dairy Products
Fruit, Vegatable, Jellies or Jams
Bakery Products, Cookies, or Crackers
Sugar or Confectionary
Malt or Other Beverages
Wine, Brandy, or Liqour
Soft Drinks
Meat Processing or Packing

Note: Various combinations of full SIC codes were used by the author
to form each of these business segments

5.5 Theoretic Organizational Variables
To this base specification, we added the variables with which we hoped to empirically
investigate the organization of the food processing industry. The very nature of cross-sectional
studies allowed for this. Even after specifying the basic ICAPM model with dummy variables,
there was still a large amount of unexplained variation in the dependant variable. This is almost
always the case in cross-sections of stock returns. We were then not simply adding extraneous
variables to an already true model, but rather such theoretical variables could serve to explain
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some of the randomness of price movements. It was hoped that these variables would
successfully account for at least some small portion of this remaining white noise, and thus
provide some insight into the organizational structure of the food processing industry.
To analyze organizational theory, we selected three measures to proxy for elements of
capital structure and firm expansion. Specifically, we utilized discounted free cash flow over
debt (CFD), the relative debt-to-equity ratio (RDE), and acquisitions as a percent of firm market
value (PAQ). CFD and RDE were selected as being representative of firm capital structure, while
PAQ embodies firm expansion activity. We then sought to add these variables to our ICAPM in
order to investigate the organizational underpinnings of the food processing industry.
Data on these variables was available within the COMPUSTAT database, but once again
some manipulation was required. CFD was available on a yearly basis, but this ratio was
undefined for those firms that had no debt. We again chose to invert this measure, ultimately
using a ratio of debt-to-free cash flow that we will call DCF. RDE was taken directly from the
database, but some calculation was also required for our PAQ variable. This measure was found
by simply taking yearly acquisitions in dollars, and dividing by the company’s market value.
With these steps completed, we then had a full panel of organizationally pertinent data for the 80
firms in our sample. The full model estimated for each year T is then depicted in equation (3),
with the entire set of dummy variables and their parameter estimates represented by DV.

AVPCT = α 0 + α1 βT + α 2 MVT + α 3 EPT + + α 4 DCFT + α 5 RDE T + α 6 PAQT + DV + ε

( 3)

Yearly descriptive statistics for the variables in this model are presented in table 3.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Final Sample
Fiscal 1999
Mean

Standard
Deviation

AVPC

0.01859

β

Fiscal 2000

Fiscal 2001

Mean

Standard
Deviation

0.03791

0.02190

0.63665

0.85475

MV
in millions $

2,185

EP

Fiscal 2002

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

0.10083

0.01080

0.04433

0.00112

0.05676

0.50695

0.66278

0.48351

0.52827

0.42549

0.41347

5,945.21

2,516.88

6,491.13

2,711.78

7,169.70

2,746.17

6,600.17

0.00324

0.23954

-0.12739

0.65562

-0.23665

1.36324

-0.73159

5.64736

DCF

0.03112

0.39297

-0.06978

1.12872

0.06658

0.47989

0.03100

0.27031

RDE

0.50188

2.92673

0.45671

1.64905

0.67846

5.73940

2.48883

9.02364

PAQ

0.03321

0.08813

0.02393

0.07813

0.05274

0.15072

0.02270

0.10601

Source: Author’s calculations from Standard and Poor’s. COMPUSTAT: North America. (October 2003).
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5.6 Theoretic Variable Expectations
Before we discuss our model results, we can make some ex-ante predictions about each
of these organizational variables under both theories. We have already discussed the expectations
of both of these theories in determining capital structure and firm boundaries. In addition, we
have discussed the specific characteristics of the food processing industry relevant to these
organizational paradigms. Thus, we can now use our organizational predictions about the capital
structure and firm expansion decisions of food manufacturers to redefine our original null
hypotheses in terms of these chosen theoretic variables.
Under the tenets of Transaction Cost Economics, we would expect that the effect of an
increase in the ratio of debt-to-free cash flow (DCF) would only have a negative impact on firm
value. This measure will rise only with an increase in firm debt or with a decrease in free cash
flow. In an industry with highly specific assets like this one, an increase in debt would be very
costly. On the other hand, less cash flow would only suggest fewer investment opportunities, and
thereby decreased value for the firm. Thus, Transaction Cost Economics predicts a negative
relationship between DCF and average monthly returns (AVPC). Likewise, Transaction Cost
Economics suggests that specificities will cause an increase in the relative proportion of debt
within the capital structure to decrease firm value. This means there should be a negative
correlation between RDE and AVPC. Finally, Transaction Cost Economics suggests that
acquisitions should always have a positive effect on firm value, even in industries like food
processing where there appears little justification. This theory then predicts a positive
relationship between our PAQ variable and AVPC.
Our expectations under Agency Theory are a bit different. In terms of the ratio of debt-tofree cash flow (DCF), this theory would predict a positive effect on firm returns. An increase in
this ratio means the company either has more debt bonding management’s activities, or less free
cash flow for management to squander. Such a change will have a favorable effect in sectors like
food manufacturing, sectors that are relatively vulnerable to agency conflict. This means Agency
Theory conversely predicts a positive correlation between DCF and AVPC. The relative debt-toequity ratio (RDE) could also be expected to have an opposite effect under the Agency Theory
paradigm. An increase in RDE should increase shareholder value through stronger financial
discipline, resulting in a positive correlation between RDE and AVPC. Finally, acquisitions with
a positive effect are certainly possible under Agency Theory, but this paradigm does allow for
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firm expansions that destroy value. The nature of the food processing industry might lead us to
expect some acquisitions that do not create value for shareholders, due to the unexceptional
governance of these firms. In experimentation, we would then allow PAQ to take either sign
under Agency Theory, although somewhat anticipating a negative relationship with AVPC.
Using these predictions, we can return to describe our original null hypotheses much
more explicitly. These hypotheses can now be presented in terms of the chosen theoretic
variables. The null hypothesis concerning capital structure was that Transaction Cost Economics
accurately explained these choices, as shown in equations (4) and (5). Similarly, the null
hypothesis regarding firm expansion was that Transaction Cost Economics correctly described
this activity, as in equation (6).
(− )

( 4 ) HOTCE = DCF
(− )

( 5 ) HOTCE = RDE
(+ )

(6)

HOTCE

= PAQ

One possible alternative to these traditional assumptions is Agency Theory. Hypotheses for
capital structure are given in equations (7) and (8), while acquisition is depicted in equation (9).
(+ )

( 7 ) H AT = DCF
(+ )

( 8 ) H AT = RDE
( + ,− )

( 9 ) H AT = PAQ

Clearly, these hypotheses offer a test of which theory better describes the actual food processing
industry. Using these hypotheses, we now set out to determine which organizational paradigm is
relevant to food manufacturers.
5.7 Statistical Procedures
The possibility of multicollinearity was investigated by examining the correlation among
the independent variables. This matter is always a concern, but was especially worrying with the
use of debt in two of these variables. Yet, with no serious relationships over the years of this
sample being found, multicollinearity was not considered to be an issue in this data, and was
consequently ignored. This model was then estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression in the SAS system.
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Heteroskedasticity was found to be a problem in this data, and was correspondingly
addressed using the Harvey Two-Step Method (Greene 2003, 233). The log of the squared
residuals was collected from the original OLS regression. The independent variables were then
regressed on these residuals for each year, with statistically significant parameter estimates (at
the 0.10 level) being multiplied by the value of the respective independent variable for each
observation. These figures were then summed, and the exponent taken. The square root of the
resulting measure then served as a weight for correcting multiplicative heteroskedasticity. A
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation was then conducted, yielding the results in table 4.
Table 4
Full ICAPM Parameter Estimates
Fiscal 1999

Fiscal 2000

Fiscal 2001

Fiscal 2002

Intercept

-.01082
(.2840)

.01277
(.1451)

-.00019772
(.9852)

-.01823
(.1319)

β

.00643
(.3608)

.010179
(.1722)

.01455*
(.0683)

.00459
(.6069)

MV
x 100,000

-.0976
(.0054)

-.02287
(.4235)

-.04287
(.4536)

.02387
(.5520)

EP

-.10101***
(.0006)

-.10535***
(<.0001)

-.02463***
(<.0001)

-.00180**
(.0232)

DC F
x 10

.0478
(.6317)

-.0023956
(.9324)

-.0411
(.6499)

.5181***
(<.0001)

RDE
x 1,000

.02405*
(.0839)

-.01664
(.7117)

.00662
(.3562)

.01997***
(.0001)

PAQ

-.02967
(.4767)

.03799
(.3288)

.02978
(.3275)

.17946***
(.0002)

DDAIRY

.02084
(.1677)

-.00328
(.8066)

-.01103
(.4960)

.08963**
(.0435)

DFVJJ

.04495***
(.0011)

.01736
(.1339)

.00388
(.7966)

-.01325
(.4443)

DGRAIN

.04990***
(.0009)

.00887
(.4828)

-.02712
(.1469)

-.00433
(.8133)

DBPC C

.10568
(.3575)

.12698
(.2279)

.02143
(.1973)

.03015
(.1032)

DSUGAR

.02331*
(.0765)

.00250
(.8289)

-.00000760
(.9996)

-.01015
(.1881)

DBEV

.02610**
(.0438)

.02223*
(.0556)

.00131
(.9313)

-.01604
(.3540)

DW BL

.02785**
(.0344)

.01208
(.2920)

.01269
(.4093)

-.01704
(.0309)

DSFTDR

.05851
(.1515)

.04781
(.1942)

-.02717*
(.0840)

.01613
(.3242)

DMEAT

.02588*
(.0918)

.00426
(.7344)

.00175
(.9167)

-.00622
(.7205)

Mode l
F-statistic

R

2

2.44***
0.3634

3.12***
0.4224

5.66***
0.5700

5.17***
0.5480

Note: p-values in parenthesis, * denotes significance at the 0.10 level, ** denotes
significance at the 0.05 level, *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level
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5.8 ICAPM Performance
Four separate regressions were undertaken on this set of companies, one for each of the
years in our sample. Some differences were found, but overall the results are fairly robust. An
important initial result was that the basic ICAPM specification performs quite well. In all four
years β takes the expected positive sign, though only once becoming statistically significant at
the 0.10 level. The fact that β is always positive is reassuring, although its lack of significance
might be worrisome. However, this is an acceptable result in the ICAPM model, as β is a useful
explanatory variable, but certainly does not explain the entire movement of securities’ prices
(Merton 1973, 868).
This fact seems obvious here, as our proxy variables from the financial literature perform
much better. The expectation for the market value variable (MV) is not extremely clear, but a
negative relationship has traditionally been suggested due to the notion that larger firms will
have slower growth prospects in the future. Yet, the real purpose of this variable was to identify
broad trends in the market affecting firms of various sizes in different ways. Our results show
that market value is negative in three years, but is statistically significant only once, at the 0.01
level during fiscal 1999. Unarguably, the MV variable is only mildly effective at picking up
these broader market trends in our regressions, but the same cannot be said for the earnings yield
variable.
Our ex-ante prediction for the sign on the earnings-to-price variable (EP) is positive,
suggesting that a stock with a higher earnings yield would signal value, and could therefore
expect superior equity price growth in the future. The parameter estimates on this variable are
significant at the 0.05 level during all four years, but with the surprising result that signs are
negative in all cases. Given the consistency of this result, this finding must be more than a simple
aberration, but it does require some explanation. Upon considering this outcome, it becomes
apparent the sign may not be unreasonable.
Lakonishok et al. classify such low-value investments as being “glamour” assets, based
on the extrapolation of past growth in earnings (Lakonishok et al. 1994, 1542). In most sectors,
this “tagging along” in the market is an ill-advised strategy, but this tactic appears effective in
the food processing industry. However, throughout much of this paper we have discussed the
importance of reputation and brand names in the food industry. With little growth in this sector
from which to extrapolate, it seems that the profitable strategy is to invest in well established
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companies. As we have discussed, firms with substantial brand-equity will likely have less risk
and greater opportunity in the food manufacturing industry. It then seems logical that this is one
case where the “glamour” strategy of investing in reputable firms trumps the typical “value”
strategies of contrarian investors (Lakonishok et al. 1994, 1575).
The market value and earnings yield variables should capture many of the broader market
trends occurring in these four years. Changes in these variables may represent concerns about
food safety, economies of scale, or numerous other factors. The dummy variables in this model
also pick up some substantial industry effects across this period. Several of these variables are
statistically significant during different years, representing unique industry changes that
occurred. Given the acceptable performance of β , EP, MV and the dummy variables, it appears
that we have controlled for many of the risk effects in this industry, allowing us to properly
examine our organizational variables.
5.9 Yearly Findings
Each yearly model performs quite well, as all four are statistically significant at the 0.01
level. With respective R 2 values of 0.36, 0.42, 0.57, and 0.54, our four yearly cross-sections from
1999 to 2002 explain a substantial portion of the variation in average monthly equity returns
(AVPC). The earlier years are noticeably weaker in their explanatory power, but all four years
perform relatively well for such cross-sectional regressions. Yet, the overall strength of these
results is what we would expect, given the use of this traditionally effective financial model for
explaining stock returns. The ICAPM is a rather flexible model, and has consequently been
successful in numerous circumstances (Brennan et al. 2003, 25). Perhaps most importantly, the
theoretically intuitive signs and general significance of the basic ICAPM specification give us
added confidence in our results concerning the experimental variables within this model.
In examining these results, it must be remembered that there is little prior empirical
support for any of these theoretic variables being related to firm performance. Acquisitions have
been researched, but not often in this type of study. The collection of results on this subject is
also quite ambiguous, providing little guidance for this variable. Work has been done using debtto-equity ratios in financial cross-sections, finding this ratio to have a positive effect on firm
returns as a proxy for risk or other inexplicable premiums (Bhandari 1988, 527). However, no
work has been conducted using the free cash flow-to-debt ratio, much less the inverse of this
figure that we employ here. No consistent relationship has been found between any of these
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variables and firm performance. Moreover, it appears that none of these measures have been
explicitly applied to a food industry. We then had no ex-ante convictions for any of these
variables, but it was hoped that, when used with the established base specification, these
variables would have a discernable effect on firm performance and could shed some light on the
organization of food manufacturers.
5.9.1 Fiscal 1999
The model for fiscal 1999 is the worst overall performer of any in the sample period, with
a model F-statistic that is significant at the 0.01 level, but is only 2.44. In this year, the dominant
variables are earnings yield and market value, both becoming significantly negative at the 0.01
level. Other statistically significant variables during this year include the DFVJJ, DGRAIN,
DSUGAR, DBEV, DWBL, and DMEAT dummy variables, all of which are positive and
significant at the 0.10 level or greater. One of our theoretical variables is statistically significant
in this year, the relative debt-to-equity variable (RDE). The coefficient on this variable is
positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The PAQ variable is negative in this case,
but is not significant at any reasonable level. The estimate on the DCF variable is positive, but is
also not significant. Though perhaps not as convincing as we might hope, the signs on these
organizational variables are exactly what Agency Theory would predict. This fact, combined
with the significantly positive effect of debt on firm returns, must lend some initial support to the
validity of Agency Theory in this industry.
5.9.2 Fiscal 2000
Our model results become a bit stronger in fiscal 2000, as the F-statistic now increases to
3.12. The negative earnings yield variable once again dominates this model, with an absolute tstatistic of over 5. However, only one other variable is significant at the 0.10 level, the DBEV
dummy variable. None of our theoretic variables are significant in this case, but examining their
signs we do find some rather weak support for the Transaction Cost Economics null hypotheses.
The sign on RDE is negative, as is the sign on DCF. At the same time, the sign of the PAQ
variable has now become positive. These signs are just as Transaction Cost Economics would
predict in the food manufacturing sector. Yet, the generally mediocre performance of these
variables in 2000 lends only very weak support to this theory. Overall, this year gives us very
little insight into the relevant organizational model for this industry.
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5.9.3 Fiscal 2001
The resulting parameter estimates on our organizational variables are similarly vague in
fiscal 2001. Our model performs quite well during this year, with an F-statistic of 5.66. This
yearly model explains the greatest proportion of variation in the dependant variable of any of our
four regressions. Once more, the negative parameter estimate on the earnings yield variable
dominates, with an absolute t-statistic now over 7. For this year, β is also positive and
statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The DSFTDR dummy is the only such variable
significant in 2001, producing a negative coefficient at the 0.10 level. Yet, despite the generally
strong performance of the model, none of our organizational variables are statistically
significant. The estimates on RDE and PAQ are positive, while the coefficient on the DCF
variable takes a negative sign. This really gives us a mixed message about the pervading
organizational structure. The RDE variable supports Agency Theory, while the DCF variable
supports Transaction Cost Economics. The PAQ variable is rather inconclusive in the case when
it is positive, being acceptable to either theory. Therefore, although our model performs quite
well, the theoretical variables provide little understanding of the organizational design of this
industry.
5.9.4 Fiscal 2002
Up to this point, the organizational paradigm seems to have been nearly latent, and
definitely problematic. However, in fiscal 2002 a dramatic change occurs. This model is
somewhat congruent to the others, with an overall F-statistic of 5.17. Earnings yield is still
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with an absolute t-statistic of over 2.3. Our
DDAIRY and DWBL dummies are both significant at the 0.05 level, taking positive and
negative signs respectively. Yet, none of these variables dominate our model. Rather, the most
significant variables during this year are the organizational variables. All three have t-statistics of
over 4, making them easily significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, these variables are almost
unanimous in their verdict about the organization of this sector. The PAQ variable takes a
positive sign, which is acceptable under either theory, simply stating that the majority of those
acquisitions that occurred were value-creating during this year. Yet, the signs on both RDE and
DCF are also positive. This lends support to the presence of agency conflict in this industry.
While the majority of acquisitions built firm value, capital structure was clearly used as a tool to
bond management’s actions during 2002. Hence, this finding represents considerable evidence
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for the authority of Agency Theory in explaining organization of the food manufacturing
industry.
5.10 Results Discussion
What overall judgments can we then make from these results? We have set out to
examine which organizational economic theory pervades in the food processing industry. In
reality, both theories likely contain credible ideas and concepts. Yet, as economic models we
must strive to improve upon them, forsaking those with less ability to explain the complex and
dynamic world in which we live. According to the scientific method, one must have valid
contradictory evidence in order to reject a theory. This is precisely the case here, as we will only
reject the null hypotheses of Transaction Cost Economic organization if we have statistically
significant evidence indicating otherwise.
In two out of four years, we reject our capital structure null hypothesis. However, we fail
to reject our firm expansion null hypothesis during all four years. Capital structure selection
indicates agency problems, but we do not find value-destroying acquisition activity. Yet, this is
not necessary under the tenets of Agency Theory. The findings about capital structure provide
evidence for Agency Theory, while the results on firm expansion do not disagree with this
model. Overall, it seems that Agency Theory has some ability to account for observed activity in
this industry. At the same time, we find little support for our null hypotheses. In the entire
sample, only one theoretic variable during fiscal 2002 is statistically significant in the direction
predicted by Transaction Cost Economics. It is obvious that the predictive ability of Transaction
Cost Economics in the food processing sector is weak at best, making the traditional reliance on
this rationale a dangerous precept. When the theoretic variables are significant, they point to
agency conflicts in this industry.
To scientifically investigate the validity of Transaction Cost Economics, single-tailed Ftests of the null hypotheses for each theoretic variable were conducted simultaneously over all
four years of the sample. The results of these tests are displayed below in table 5. The null
hypothesis that DCF is less than zero is rejected at the 0.01 level, while we fail to reject that
RDE is negative over this period. We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that PAQ is positive,
although this finding provides little organizational insight. Given these results, we must reject the
null hypothesis of Transaction Cost Economic organization in the food processing industry, due
to evidence that capital structure is incorrectly described by this theory. The outcome concerning
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acquisition does not contradict Agency Theory, and this model correctly explains these capital
structure choices. Therefore, agency problems may exist in these firms, and as such analysts
should consider Agency Theory when examining this industry.
Table 5
F-tests of Null Hypotheses for 1999-2002
Null Hypothesis

FS

FC

F-statistic

Critical Valueª

8.33*

6.63

0.42

6.63

6.87

-6.63

Pr > FS

(− )

TCE = DCF
HO

(.0042 )
Pr > FS

(− )

HOTCE = RDE

Result

FS > FC ⇒ Reject

FS < FC ⇒ Fail to Reject

(.5191 )
Pr < FS

(+ )

TCE
HO
= PAQ

p -value

FS > FC ⇒ Fail to Reject

(.9907 )

Note: ª at the 0.01 level,* denotes significance at the 0.01 level

Upon initial examination of our results, this type of conclusion might seem a bit bold.
Even though we provide notable support for Agency Theory, there is still less consistency in
these results than might be hoped. The last year of our analysis seems to be far more theoretically
compelling than the earlier years. Yet, using historical knowledge of US equity markets, this
would actually be the expected result. Markets are certainly dynamic, and it appears obvious that
a structural change has occurred in the US during the past few years. Our theoretical variables
are absolutely decisive in fiscal 2002, but why would this be?
This is likely because 2001 was approximately the period when this structural change
occurred. 2001 witnessed the collapse of energy giant Enron, and the beginning of a string of
corporate scandals. These scandals rocked the investing world, and almost certainly caused a
fundamental change in investor sentiment within the US. In light of these scandals, Agency
Theory has taken on an entirely new level of importance for the economy. The issues of
governance and agency conflict are now foremost on the minds of investors. It is then no surprise
that Agency Theory currently has significant explanatory power as an organizational model,
much more so than before this structural change.
There have not yet been any large corporate scandals in the food processing industry, but
the sector is potentially vulnerable to such events. When examining the ramifications of this
structural change in the food processing industry, the nature of its investors must be considered.
Food manufacturing companies typically have low β ’s (refer back to table 3), leading to industry
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returns that are less volatile than the broader market. Those investing in food processing firms
are typically long-term investors, counting on measured growth and shelter from market
downturns. These investors are now concerned with protecting their long positions, looking
toward governance reforms to prevent firm implosions. Given this recent structural change and
the characteristics of both firms and investors in this industry, it is not surprising that Agency
Theory has gained explanatory power. Perhaps Agency Theory has not always been the
dominant organizational model in the food processing industry, but it seems clear that it is today.
There is one other very important consideration that must be remembered in weighing
these theories. In this debate, it appears that Transaction Cost Economics is a sort of all or
nothing argument. If we admit the presence of some agency conflict, then we must admit the
existence of agency problems in general. Even if our results had not been as conclusive, just one
year indicating discord between principles and agents would theoretically doom Transaction
Cost Economics. Our empirical results are much stronger, but at the bare minimum they indicate
that agency problems do persist to some degree in the food processing industry. This, in and of
itself, is a major result that suggests the tenets of Agency Theory should be considered when
analyzing the strategic actions of firms in this sector.
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CHAPTER SIX
Application
6.1 Organizational Analysis
How then are these results relevant? This paper began with a discussion of why it is vital
for agricultural producers to understand the food processing firm’s decision process, but we also
noted how little is currently known. Yet, if the appropriate organizational model can be
determined, then one can predict the activity of an individual firm as a function of that firm’s
specific organizational characteristics. We call this type of approach “organizational analysis”.
This tool may also be helpful in explaining firm actions ex-post. For example, since we have
shown that Agency Theory has relevance in the food processing industry, we can then
productively analyze firm activity using observed governance structures and the principles of this
paradigm. Strongly governed firms will pursue the objectives of owners, while weakly governed
firms will pursue the interests of management. The decisions of food manufacturers can then be
explained or predicted in relation to these aspects by farmers or other interested parties. In any
case where an organizational model can be proven relevant, a great deal can be inferred about the
firm’s decision process. We are unaware of the concept of organizational analysis appearing
previously, but it is only a logical extension of this type of research.
6.1.1 Capital Structure Analysis
Our study has dealt specifically with the aspects of capital structure and acquisition.
Using our results about organization in this industry, we can then provide some simple diagrams
of how organizational analysis might be conducted. In terms of capital structure, our results
indicate that we can expect firms with stronger governance to increase value by bonding
management with more debt, as diagramed in figure 4.
Figure 6

Organizational Analysis of the Capital Structure Decision
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6.1.2 Acquisition Analysis
As far as firm expansion is concerned, Agency Theory suggests that companies with stronger
governance structures will undertake acquisitions that increase firm value, while those with weak
governance will engage in value-destroying acquisition, as shown in figure 5. We have found
acquisitions to be value-building in this industry, but if agency problems exist then such
undesirable actions are still a distinct possibility.
Figure 7
Organizational Analysis of the Acquisition Decision

Though merely simplistic layouts for how these problems can be considered, such diagrams are
constructive in showing the manner in which organizational analysis can be undertaken. Once we
know the underlying organizational paradigm, we then have insight into numerous aspects of the
firm.
6.1.3 Organizational Analysis Example
To illustrate this concept, we will return a final time to our chicken industry example. As
we have already discussed, chicken producers will often be part of a network of suppliers
dominated by one local processor. A hypothetical scenario where organizational analysis might
be invaluable thus includes an independent chicken grower’s decision to adopt a new breed of
broilers. These chicks have slightly higher purchase costs, but improved carcass yields make
these genetics profitable to the grower. However, gains from this broiler variety can only be
realized if the processor invests in new cutting technologies capable of harvesting the additional
yields. This decision then becomes completely dependant on the actions of the food processor.
Organizational analysis can be used to infer whether the chicken processor will undertake
this investment. Suppose it is even clear that purchasing modern cutting equipment has
transactional justification in this case, leading to increased profitability for the manufacturer.
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This investment decision might seem straightforward, but we have shown that Agency Theory
must also be considered in the food processing industry. This particular chicken manufacturing
firm is subject to weak internal and external governance, and is believed to suffer from serious
agency conflicts. Given such a governance structure, the producer consequently may not be
confidant that this company’s management is acting to maximize profits. The grower will then
be unwilling to rely on the processor’s investment, and will adopt strategy accordingly by
retaining conventional broiler genetics in their operation. By using organizational analysis, the
grower is able to choose their optimal non-cooperative strategy and maximize returns in the
market.
This truly shows the practical value of organizational research. Specifically, our diagrams
and example demonstrate how the principles of Agency Theory can be used to undertake a
methodical examination of individual firms in the food processing industry. This is useful to
agricultural producers and other actors in the food channel, as it allows for inference about the
future actions of these firms. These smaller players will no longer find themselves completely
unapprised of new initiatives in the food system, but rather can make preemptive decisions to
counter the expected strategies of powerful food manufacturing firms.
The modern corporation is certainly one of the most veiled and impenetrable economic
actors. Yet, using organizational analysis and some endowment of relevant information about the
firm’s governance structure and opportunity set, we should be able to successfully predict or
explain many firm strategies. This then provides a basic theoretical framework for analyzing the
actions of complex firms, something sorely missing from the field of agricultural economics at
the current time.
6.2 Implications for Future Empirical Studies
There is another specific application for these results. Nearly as important as our findings
indicating the efficacy of Agency Theory, are simply those indicating the fundamental relevance
of organizational economics. Firm organization has often been overlooked in economics and
finance. Financial markets are full of various types of information that make stock price
movements very difficult to explain. It is important to notice the usefulness of these
organizational proxies in explaining some of this market randomness. This shows that these
theories are capable of analyzing the rather opaque firm decision-making process. Our models
lend support to the idea that organizational structure affects firm performance, regardless of
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whether these factors are explicitly considered by investors. Consequently, the presented results
provide some credence for including organizational variables in future financial studies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion
7.1 Summary
The objective of this paper was to determine which prevalent organizational model,
Transaction Cost Economics or Agency Theory, best describes the actions of food processors. To
explore this question, we have developed logical predictions from these theories through a
detailed examination of the food processing industry. Our null hypotheses were that the
traditional Transaction Cost Economic model would best describe capital structure and
expansion activity in the food manufacturing industry. To meet our study objective, we have
empirically tested these hypotheses in a sample of food processing firms.
Our empirical results lead us to reject the first null hypothesis of Transaction Cost
Economics explaining capital structure in this sector. The positive effects of debt on firm value
suggest its use to bond management. The negative impact of free cash flow supports the idea that
weakly governed managers are pursuing undesired investments. These empirical results closely
match the predictions of Agency Theory, and refute the widely accepted Transaction Cost
Economics rationale.
However, our findings also support failing to reject the second null hypothesis, which
states that Transaction Cost Economics describes firm expansion in this industry. Acquisition
activity has a positive impact on firm value in our sample. This defends the idea that these
expansions are undertaken to reduce the costs associated with exchange. Yet, this does not mean
that we accept Transaction Cost Economics as the correct theory. The empirical evidence
supports the predictions of this model, but does not necessarily contradict Agency Theory.
In terms of our study objective, it seems that we can draw some important conclusions
about organization of the food manufacturing industry. Capital structure seems to be a tool for
assuaging agency losses, but the majority of acquisitions are revealed to be value-building.
Agency Theory allows for value-destroying expansion, but certainly does not preclude
acquisitions that increase firm value. Thus, the rejection of the first null hypothesis supports
Agency Theory, while the failure to reject the second does not disagree with it. Therefore,
Agency Theory appears to be the better organizational model for explaining the actions of food
processors.
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The results concur with recent developments in the US securities market. The evidence
for Agency Theory is much stronger in 2002. Organizational structures certainly evolve over
time, and it is logical that the highly publicized corporate scandals beginning in late 2001 had a
substantial effect. The market, and more generally public opinion, blamed losses on agency
problems. Sentiment was fundamentally altered, as investors started to ponder how great the
misalignment of incentives between managers and shareholders might be. There appears little
reason why these events would not have impacted the food manufacturing industry. Agency
Theory may have only recently become meaningful to food processors, but it seems that
resolving agency conflict is currently an important consideration in firm decision-making. This
makes Agency Theory the appropriate organizational model for analyzing activity in the food
processing industry.
This information can now be used by agricultural producers and other parties in the food
system. Food processors often have a strong influence on smaller players, especially farmers.
With increased knowledge of how these firms make decisions, agricultural producers can adopt
improved strategies. Marketing channels for agricultural commodities will continue to be
coordinated by food manufacturers, but farmers can now better understand these actions and
position themselves accordingly.
7.2 Research Opportunities
This study is a starting point for further research in this field. What has been provided is
merely an initial overview and simple test of these powerful organizational theories. Our
experiments were exceedingly broad, lacking data with pure organizational meaning. Initial
results indicate the appropriateness of Agency Theory for describing organization of the food
processing industry. However, different tests in other sectors need to be undertaken in order to
verify the general robustness of this finding. Numerous predictions of organizational theory
could be applied, preferably using more specific data tied directly to firm organizational
structure. There is a massive amount of work to be done in this area, with room for vastly
improved tests of these theories. Unfortunately, firm specific data on organizational
characteristics can be quite difficult to obtain. Though this information may be hard to come by,
it appears that the rewards for such endeavors could be a substantial expansion of our basic
understanding of economic organization.
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Organizational principles are tied to nearly every economic discipline, and as such
research in this area should be widely beneficial. Large corporations dominate the US economy.
It appears this fact will become even truer in the food processing industry, where consolidation
and industrialization continue to raise the level of concentration (Harris et al. 2002, 6). The
interaction between agricultural producers and food manufacturers is becoming increasingly
important to the evolution of the US food system. Coordination has increased substantially in
recent years, forcing farmers to work more closely with food processing firms. This bargaining
process has been difficult for agricultural producers, as it is hard enough to predict the actions of
supposedly rational individuals, let alone companies filled with thousands of such actors.
The problem can become nearly intractable, and as a result has been almost ignored, even
in academia. Yet, beyond its importance to agriculture or even the US economy, our
understanding of how complex firms operate and why they undertake certain activities is
fundamental to the field of economics. If we as economists are to truly have an understanding of
our science that goes beyond the proverbial “black box” of introductory production courses, then
the theories of economic organization must be the foundation.
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